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1. Introduction 
The original objective of this deliverable was to study the implications of the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) decoupled payments for individual tenant farms in the EU-15 and 
corporate farms in the New Member States (NMS) based on the results of the farm survey 
undertaken within Workpackage 3. However, there were not important variations in the 
responses between mainly tenanted and mainly owned individual farms in the surveyed EU-
15 countries (France, Sweden and the UK). For this reason, all aspects of the individual 
farms’ behaviour and corporate farms’ intentions to adjust the scale of their operation and 
their output mix to the decoupled payments were analysed and presented in Deliverable 14. 
The present deliverable focuses on the implications of the introduction of the Single Area 
Payments (SAP) for the corporate farms in the NMS from the point of view of the behaviour 
of the landowners who rent their land to the corporate farms. The question about the potential 
response of the landowners to the SAP is a key to understand some of the driving forces of the 
structural change in NMS farming. On the one hand, massive withdrawals of land from the 
corporate farms might bring about an accelerated individualisation of farming in those NMS 
where corporate farms are still important. On the other hand, such a process could undermine 
in the short- to mid-term the international competitiveness of NMS agriculture. A recent study 
commissioned by the UK Ministry of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) 
indicates that most probably the corporate farms will continue to represent the core of the 
competitive farming units in those NMS where such farms are wide spread, although the 
concrete relative competitiveness between corporate and individual farms will vary depending on 
the product (DEFRA, 2005).   
The main conflict that could undermine the long-term existence of corporate farms under the 
CAP SAP concerns the distributional issues that may arise in relation to the way profit 
(including the CAP payments) will be distributed between rentals, dividends, wages and 
investment. As noted by Brem and Kim (2000), a corporate farm can be considered as an 
economic organisation consisting of different interest groups (the various stakeholders) who 
bargain on the objectives of this organisation: landowners, capital holders, workers and 
managers. The separation of ownership and control might induce managers to fulfil objectives 
that are not the other stakeholders’ objectives, such as increasing the farm’s size (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Williamson, 1983). 
As the CAP payments are allocated to the farm holdings, their use is at the discretion of the 
corporate farm managers. The latter have several options, such as using the payments for the 
current business operations, for investment, for repayment of debts or for increasing the 
payments to the various stakeholders. Since it is assumed that the managers derive an 
increasing utility from the farm growth, they might prefer to use the payments for the farming 
business. Therefore, the CAP payments might exacerbate the conflicts between the managers 
and the other stakeholders within corporate farms regarding the use of profit. In particular, the 
conflicts between managers and landowners are a major issue for some of the NMS where 
corporate farms (producer co-operatives, joint-stock companies and limited liability 
companies) cultivate the majority of agricultural land, e.g. the Czech Republic and Slovakia. 
The corporate farms rent most of their utilised agricultural area from individual landowners 
(e.g. 97 percent in the Czech Republic in 2003; CSO, 2003). If the landowners are not 
satisfied with the level of rent they receive from the farm, they have the option to end their 
rental contract and withdraw their land from the farm. The ease, or otherwise, to do this 
depends on the tenancy legislation in each country, the time period of the contract, when and 
how the lease may be terminated, and the requirements for notice of termination. However, in 
most of the NMS land rental agreements are rather short term. 
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The corporate farms in the NMS do not have counterparts in the EU-15, where family farming 
prevails, as most of them have their roots in the pre-1990 collectivised agriculture in Central 
and Eastern Europe. Producer co-operatives are mainly successors of the previous collective 
farms that existed under the centrally planned system, however, some of them are transformed 
state farms. Limited liability companies have their origin in the privatisation of the state 
farms. At the beginning of the process, state farms’ assets were leased to small groups of 
people, normally involving the former farm managers (Ratinger and Rabinowicz, 1997). 
Gradually, the non-land assets were sold to the lessees at favourable conditions with 
rescheduled payments. The joint-stock companies have a large number of shareholders (a few 
hundreds). Part of them has roots either as state farms or as inter co-operative enterprises. 
However, some of the companies were created during the post-reform period.  
Often, the landowners who had acquired land as a result of the land restitution process in 
1990s left it within the corporate farms. Several factors influenced this decision: people who 
acquired land did not have experience in farming; during the transition the general economic 
risk was high and the profitability of agriculture was low. In addition, the transaction costs to 
have the restituted ownership in demarcated boundaries and with physical access to the plots 
were very high. Initially, landowners were paid a notional rent based on administrative land 
valuation, but they accepted it as the demand for agricultural land outside the corporate farms 
was low. All these factors made the owners reluctant to bear the transaction costs of 
withdrawing their land, as the monetary benefits from renting the land outside the corporate 
farms were uncertain. Therefore, before accession to the EU the landowners did not have 
strong incentives to withdraw, as the other opportunities available were not associated with 
higher returns on land ownership. In particular, as mentioned above, individual farming was 
viewed as non-profitable. However, this situation might change as the landowners can now 
cash the SAP themselves, providing they keep their land in good agricultural and 
environmental condition (GAEC). 
In order to provide insights into the potential response of the landowners to the SAP, a priori 
expectations were first generated with the help of a game theory framework. To see whether 
empirical support for these propositions could be found, data on the past occurrences of rent 
renegotiations and land withdrawals were collected from individual landowners in Slovakia 
and the Czech Republic, the two NMS in which the role of corporate farms for the 
agricultural sector is central. Landowners were also asked about their future intentions under 
the SAP scheme. The answers of Slovakian landowners were cross-checked with data 
collected through the main IDEMA farm survey. As presented in Deliverable 14, Chapter 8, 
152 corporate farms were interviewed in Slovakia, including 101 cooperatives and 51 
companies.  
The next section of this report presents the theoretical game and the propositions generated 
regarding landowners’ expected behaviour. The third section describes the survey of 
landowners and details the findings from the analysis of the survey data, while the fourth 
section investigates the data collected through the corporate farm survey. The last section 
concludes and draws policy implications. 
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2. Theoretical representation of the conflicts between the corporate farms and their 
landowners 
In the corporate farms landowners have three options concerning the returns on their land. 
The first option is the status quo, namely to keep the land in the farm for the same rent. The 
second option is to ask for a rent increase and the third one is to withdraw the land from the 
corporate farms. Landowners will choose option two if they are not satisfied with the current 
level of the rent and option three if the rent renegotiations are unsuccessful. As the 
negotiations between corporate farm managers and landowners about the level of rent are at 
the core of the issue, game theory has been employed as a framework to aid in generating the 
prior expectations. In order to ease the understanding of how the propositions have been 
generated, a simple game used. 
2.1. Description of the game 
The game includes two representative players, a farm manager and a landowner, and is a non-
cooperative static one. The negotiation process is one-shot; the manager (F) and the 
landowner (L) meet together once to decide about the level of the rent and there is no room 
for counter-offers. The game is represented in its extensive form by the tree depicted in Figure 
1. In this representation, the game is sequential; players move one after another. The farm’s 
manager makes the first move by announcing the level of the rent. It is assumed that only two 
offers are possible, a low rent and a high rent. The low rent is the rent that is usually paid to 
the landowners, while the high rent includes an increase following the renegotiation. Once the 
manager has played, the landowner decides whether to accept or to refuse the rent offered. If 
they accept, the game ends and the land is rented at the agreed rent level. If they refuse, the 
game also ends but the rental contract is terminated and the land is withdrawn. However, this 
can only happen when a low rent is offered. When a high rent is offered, it is assumed that the 
landowner never refuses it. In other words, the high rent always matches the landowner’s 
expectation; it is not less than what the landowner could get outside the corporate farm. 
The landowner’s choice of action depends on whether they have a better opportunity 
elsewhere. This is modelled here by introducing two types of landowners. Type 1 (L1) is a 
landowner who has a better opportunity for the land outside the corporate farm. For example, 
another farm might have offered a higher rent, or a higher payoff might be obtained by 
farming the land individually. Such a landowner represents a credible threat of withdrawal. 
By contrast, the type 2 (L2) is a landowner who has no better opportunity for their land 
elsewhere and there is no credible threat of withdrawal. Let us denote the probability that the 
landowner is of type 1 (credible threat) by p. This indicates the proportion of type 1 
landowners in the population. (1–p) is thus the probability of landowner of type 2 (no credible 
threat). In the game tree in Figure 1, Nature (N) plays the first move of the game by randomly 
choosing the type of landowner. Both paths from nodes F1 and F2 are similar. Only the 
probability of the path, p or (1–p), and some payoffs differ. It is assumed that there is 
asymmetric information about the landowners’ type. Although managers have information 
about the characteristics of the plot, they are not fully informed about their landowners’ 
values and situation, as most of them are absentee landowners living in large cities. 
 
N 
F1 
L1A 
L1B
F2 
L2A 
L2B 
Rents out for a low rent 
Withdraws 
Rents out for a high rent 
L
rentlow
F
rentlow   ,ΠΠ  
1, Lwithdrawal
F
withdrawal ΠΠ
L
renthigh
F
renthigh   ,ΠΠ  
Low rent 
High rent 
Agrees 
Refuses 
Agrees 
Agrees 
Agrees 
Refuses 
Low rent 
High rent 
 
Rents out for a low rent 
Withdraws 
Rents out for a high rent 
L
rentlow
F
rentlow   ,ΠΠ
2, Lwithdrawal
F
withdrawal ΠΠ
L
renthigh
F
renthigh   ,ΠΠ
Outcomes Payoffs 
 
 
N: Nature. F: corporate farm’s manager. L: landowner. 
Landowner 2: with no 
opportunities for land 
(probability 1-p) 
Landowner 1: with 
opportunities for land 
(probability p) 
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Figure 1: The tree of the game between a manager and a landowner  
 
Table 1 offers an alternative representation showing the possible actions of each player. The 
tree in Figure 1 indicates that the manager of a corporate farm can choose between two 
actions “offer a low rent” and “offer a high rent”. Concerning the landowners, the tree 
indicates that they can either agree or refuse the offer. This is based on their willingness to 
accept a low or a high rent. Hence, the negotiation process can be represented as one-shot: the 
manager and the landowner meet together once to decide the level of the rent and make 
simultaneous offers. The landowner would ask either for a low rent or for a high rent, which 
are the two possible actions “Low rent” and “High rent” presented in Table 1. 
There are four possible strategy profiles in the game and therefore four possible payoff 
vectors, as shown by Table 1. If both players choose the same action, they reach an agreement 
and the landowner rents the land out to the farm for the specific rent agreed upon. If the rent is 
low, the outcome is “no change”; if the rent is high, the outcome is “rent increase”. If the 
landowner asks for a low rent while the farm’s manager proposes a high rent, it is 
straightforward to assume that there is an agreement on renting the land at a high rent and the 
outcome is “rent increase”. Finally, if the farm’s manager offers a low rent but the landowner 
asks for a high rent, there is no agreement and the rental contract is terminated. The 
landowner withdraws their land from the farm; the outcome is “land withdrawal”. The latter is 
the most interesting and important case in view of the overall IDEMA objectives as well as 
the aims of this deliverable. 
Table 1: The payoff matrix of the game between a landowner and a corporate farm 
manager 
  LANDOWNER 
  Low rent High rent 
Low rent 
No change 
L
rentlow
F
rentlow   ,ΠΠ  
Land withdrawal 
L
withdrawal
F
withdrawal ΠΠ ,  
FARM 
High rent 
Rent increase 
L
renthigh
F
renthigh   ,ΠΠ  
Rent increase 
L
renthigh
F
renthigh   ,ΠΠ  
Note: denotes the payoff of the i-th player (i=F for the farm manager; i=L for the landowner) in the j-th 
situation (there are three possibilities for j: the land is rented for a low rent, the land is rented for a high rent, or 
the land is withdrawn). 
i
jΠ
The payoffs for each player and strategy are not explicitly stated here, but assumptions about 
their ranking can be made. The farm manager will prefer to pay a low rent than a high rent, 
but the land withdrawal is costly for the farm as it reduces the area farmed and consequently it 
may decrease the revenue and farm profit. In addition, the farm manager may generate utility 
from personal income and prestige related to the management of a larger farm. Therefore, the 
farm’s payoffs are ranked as follows: 
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F
withdrawal
F
renthigh
F
rentlow Π>Π>Π    (1) 
As far as the landowner is concerned, irrespective of their type, they will prefer to receive a 
high rather than a low rent. But if the payoffs of a withdrawal for type 1 (credible threat) are 
greater than the payoffs of continuing renting the land to the corporate farm for a low rent 
(Equation 2). The situation of type 2 (no credible threat) is the opposite (Equation 3): 
L
rentlow
L
withdrawal
L
renthigh   Π>Π>Π 1  (2) 
2
  
L
withdrawal
L
rentlow
L
renthigh Π>Π>Π   (3) 
Players choose to play the strategy that maximises their payoff. The type 1 landowner is 
indifferent between receiving a high rent in the corporate farm and withdrawing the land, but 
refuses to rent out the land to the corporate farm for a low rent. In other words, if the farm 
plays “low rent”, the landowner’s best response is to play “high rent”, and if the farm plays 
“high rent”, the landowner is indifferent between “low rent” and “high rent”. Therefore, the 
type 1 landowner’s strongly dominant strategy is a high rent and this will be played by them 
regardless of what might be played by the opponent (Rasmusen, 1994). Similarly, the type 2 
landowner’s strongly dominant strategy is to ask for a low rent in order to avoid the 
termination of the rental contract. 
There is no dominant strategy for the manager, as their payoff maximisation depends on the 
landowner’s strategy, but the manager has a set of two best responses. If the landowner plays 
“low rent”, the manager’s best response is “low rent”, but if the landowner plays “high rent”, 
the manager’s best response is “high rent”. If there were no information asymmetry and the 
landowner’s type was common knowledge, then the manager would know which action 
would be taken by the other party. Therefore, in the case of a type 1 (credible threat) 
landowner, both players would choose to play “high rent”, and land would be rented for a 
high rent. In the case of a type 2 (no credible threat) landowner, both players would choose to 
play “low rent”, and land would be rented for a low rent. This means that, in reality, if the 
manager has information about the landowner’s type, the land will always stay within the 
corporate farm. If the manager cannot identify the opponent’s type, it is assumed that they 
have some beliefs about the prior probability of the landowner’s types, p and (1–p). 
Therefore, the manager knows that “high rent” will be played by the opponent with 
probability p, and “low rent” will be played with probability 1–p. The manager will then play 
the strategy that brings the greater of the possible expected payoffs. If the manager plays “low 
rent”, respectively “high rent”, their expected payoff would be , respectively 
, where: 
F
lowrentEΠ
F
highrentEΠ
F
withdrawal
F
lowrent
F
lowrent ppE Π+Π−=Π )1(  (4) 
F
highrent
F
highrent
F
highrent
F
highrent ppE Π=Π+Π−=Π )1(  (5) 
Whether  is smaller or greater than  is specific to each farm as it depends 
on the value of the payoffs . Therefore, all three outcomes are 
possible, but their frequency depends on the value of the probability p. For example, if the 
proportion of landowners with credible threat (type 1) in the population is small, p is close to 
0 and consequently  is approximately , which is greater than 
. Similarly, if p is very large,  is approximately , which 
is strictly less than . 
F
lowrentEΠ FhighrentEΠ
F
withdrawal
F
highrent
F
lowrent ΠΠΠ ,,
F
lowrentEΠ FlowrentΠ
F
highrent
F
highrentE Π=Π FlowrentEΠ FwithdrawalΠ
F
highrent
F
highrentE Π=Π
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So far, however, the whole game has been based on the assumption that the farm is able to 
offer the two levels of rent. If the farm is financially constrained, which has been a typical 
situation in the Central and Eastern European agriculture before the accession to the EU, and 
cannot afford a rent increase, the game reduces to the upper half of Table 1. In such a 
situation, for a type 2 landowner (no credible threat) the solution will still be to rent the land 
for a low rent, but in the case of a type 1 (credible threat) the solution will be a withdrawal. 
Therefore, the outcome “land withdrawal” can occur in any farm which is financially 
constrained and cannot afford a rent increase. 
In summary, the frequency of each of the three outcomes depends on the level of the 
probability p and of the farm financial constraints. The smaller the p, the more frequent is the 
outcome “no change”. The more financially constrained the farms are, the more frequent are 
the outcomes “no change” and “land withdrawal”. 
 
2.2. Landowners’ behaviour before and after the application of the Single Area Payment 
(SAP) 
 
Landowners’ behaviour before the accession to the EU and the CAP implementation can be 
summarised in the following propositions. 
Proposition 1: Before the implementation of the CAP the outcome “no change” was more 
frequent than the outcomes “ask for a rent increase” and “withdraw land”. 
The outcome “no change” prevailed as many farms were financially constrained due to the 
low profitability or loss-making, but most landowners had no better alternatives to receive 
higher returns on their land outside the corporate farm. 
After the introduction of the SAP, the following two propositions concerning landowners’ 
behaviour can be formulated: 
Proposition 2: After the implementation of the CAP the frequency of the outcome “no 
change” will decrease. 
Proposition 3: After the implementation of the CAP the outcome “withdraw land” will not be 
more frequent than the other two outcomes “no change and “ask for a rent increase”. 
It is proposed that the frequency of the outcome “no change” might decrease as, following the 
CAP implementation, p will increase as more landowners might be able to make a credible 
threat of withdrawal. The SAP delivered without attached requirements to produce might give 
incentives to landowners to manage their land themselves if the profit from it (taking into 
consideration the cross-compliance costs) were to exceed the rent they receive in the 
corporate farms. Hence, it can be expected that more landowners will want to change their 
situation and renegotiate their rent. However, as stated in Proposition 3, despite an increase in 
rent renegotiations, withdrawals are not expected to be massive for two reasons. First, the 
introduction of the SAP is expected to relax farm financial constraints and thus more farms 
will be able to offer a high rent. Second, the probability p will not increase dramatically, 
meaning that the overall number of landowners with credible threat will not rise considerably 
in the next few years. This will be due in part to the typical small scale land ownership in the 
NMS and the relatively low direct payments per hectare due to the phasing-in. If the 
landowners contemplate to withdraw land for individual management, the SAP might not be 
enough to offset the costs of cross-compliance (under the assumption that the cross-
compliance will be properly enforced and monitored). The other reason is that the 
landowners, most of whom are absentee, might still prefer to have their land managed by 
somebody else and often the corporate farm is the obvious choice.  
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3. Survey of corporate farms’ landowners 
In the previous section some prior expectations about the landowners’ behaviour under the 
SAP were formulated. In order to see whether there is empirical support for these 
propositions, a survey of individual owners of land rented to corporate farms was carried out 
in Slovakia and the Czech Republic. In Slovakia, two surveys were undertaken: first, the 
common IDEMA farm survey and, second, an additional survey of individual landowners.  
The Czech Republic was not one of the case study countries chosen for the IDEMA farm 
survey. However, due to the good collaboration with the Czech project participant, the 
Research Institute of Agricultural Economics in Prague (VUZE), it was possible to implement 
a survey of landowners in order to investigate whether there are country differences in the 
landowners’ intentions stemming from the differences in external environment. This section 
describes the modalities of the survey of individual landowners in Slovakia and the Czech 
Republic. 
3.1. The questionnaire 
The questionnaire was designed by Imperial College and INRA in collaboration with the 
Research Institute for Agricultural and Food Economics in Bratislava (VUEPP) and VUZE. 
The core of the questionnaire was identical for the two countries. Because this was the only 
survey conducted in the Czech Republic, the Czech questionnaire was expanded by some 
additional questions (see both countries’ questionnaires in Appendices 1 and 2). 
The questionnaire included four sections. The first section incorporated questions regarding 
the respondents’ and their plots’ characteristics. The questions regarding landowners’ 
characteristics collected information on their age, education, employment status, distance 
from place of residence to the corporate farms, ownership (or a lack) of an individual farm. 
Detailed questions about the plots rented to the corporate farms were also included, such as 
the size and production on the plot, whether a land consolidation programme was 
implemented in the area (for the Czech Republic only), the rent level and how it was paid. 
Respondents were asked if they were offered a higher rent outside the corporate farm in the 
past, or (for the Czech Republic only) if there was interest to purchase their plot. Finally, this 
section incorporated questions aimed at understanding the landowners’ relations with the 
corporate farms’ management (length of the relationship, frequency of the contacts) and with 
the other landowners of the corporate farm (whether they knew who they were). 
The Czech questionnaire included a few questions concerning the characteristics of the 
corporate farms, namely the legal type, the utilised agricultural area (UAA) and whether the 
respondent had a role in the farm in addition to land ownership, e.g. employee or partner. 
Such questions were not included in the questionnaire for Slovakia. Originally the idea was 
that such information would be collected through the farm survey in Slovakia. It was expected 
that the surveyed corporate farms would provide the addresses of their landowners. However, 
the corporate farms found the questions sensitive and refused to release this information 
fearing that the survey might provide incentives to their landowners to start land 
renegotiations.   
As the objective of the survey was to understand whether the SAP would induce a change in 
landowners’ behaviour, information about their past behaviour before the EU accession was 
necessary. In the second and third sections of the questionnaire the landowners were asked 
whether in the past they had asked for a rent increase or have withdrawn some land and the 
reasons for doing so or opting for the status quo. Finally, in the forth section concerning 
future intentions, landowners were provided with the Single Area Payment Scheme modalities 
and asked whether this scheme would stimulate them to renegotiate their rent or to withdraw 
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their land from the corporate farms and the reasons behind their intention to change or not 
their behaviour. They were also asked whether they would consider selling their land. The 
time horizon was set at five years. 
3.2. The data collection 
As mentioned above, the original idea was that in Slovakia the sampled corporate farms 
would be approached, asked questions about their rented land, and own intentions and attitude 
under the SAP, and then asked to provide some of their landowners’ addressees. The 
landowners’ questionnaire would then be mailed to these landowners. This would have been a 
fruitful way to compare the expectations of the corporate farm management for their 
landowners’ behaviour with the landowners’ intentions. As this was not possible due to the 
refusal of the corporate farm management to release the addresses of the landowners, 
landowners were selected from the cadastres. In both countries, the cadastral areas were 
chosen to be representative in terms of agricultural conditions, less favoured areas (LFA), 
economic development and implementation of land consolidation.  
Four NUTS IV districts were chosen in Slovakia (see Map 1): Trnava and Banovce in the 
West Slovakia region (NUTS II), Banska Bystrica in the Middle Slovakia region (NUTS II), 
and Bardejov in the East Slovakia region (NUTS II). The district in the East Slovakia is on the 
Polish border and is characterised by a low economic development, high unemployment and 
large LFA coverage (mountainous area). Contrary, both districts in the West Slovakia are in a 
productive lowland or hilly area and benefit from a better economic situation in terms of 
wealth and employment. The district in the Middle Slovakia is in a mountainous area and is 
positioned between the East and West regions in terms of economic situation. It benefits from 
substantial revenues from tourism. 
In the Czech Republic the questionnaires were sent to landowners located in 17 different 
NUTS III sub-regions (see Map 2). These sub-regions can be aggregated in three main 
regions, relatively homogenous in terms of agricultural conditions. Survey Region 1 
(Southern Moravia) includes five districts. This area, situated in the South-East of the country 
on the border with Austria and Slovakia, is agriculture oriented, with the highest production 
of wine (90 percent of the country’s vineyard) and cereals. The unemployment rate is 
however higher than in the rest of the country. A large share of the area has been or still is 
under the land consolidation programme (38 percent of the region area), which is more than 
the average for the Czech Republic. Survey Region 2 (Central Bohemia) consists of six 
districts, situated in the northern middle Bohemia. This area is characterised by a high 
population density and low unemployment rate, and by flat landscape which results in larger 
average farm size than in the two other regions. The land consolidation concerns 16 percent of 
this region’s area. Seven districts are located in the survey Region 3 (Highlands), three of 
them are in the Central highlands of the country and four in Western Bohemia around Prague. 
These seven districts were grouped together as they have similar geographical conditions 
(highlands; 70 percent of the area under LFA). However, the Western Bohemia districts 
benefit from a better soil quality and more developed infrastructure (due to the proximity of 
Prague). Only 10 percent of the area is covered by past or current process of land 
consolidation.  
VUEPP and VUZE implemented the survey in spring 2005. In Slovakia, the survey was 
carried out face-to-face by interviewers mandated by VUEPP. These interviewers were 
known to VUEPP to be either members of farmers’ organisations, working in public 
administration or former managers of collective farms. They were asked to find out 
landowners using their social networks. This may have created bias in the Slovakian sample. 
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Therefore the results should be interpreted with caution. Altogether 183 landowners were 
interviewed.  
In the Czech Republic, the interview was predominantly by post and 1,353 questionnaires 
were used: 1,311 sent by post and 42 delivered personally. Out of the questionnaires sent by 
post, 64 were not delivered due to, for example, a change in address. Overall, 202 
questionnaires were returned with a return rate of 14.8 percent. 
3.3. Explorative analysis of the sample 
The usable records were 183 in Slovakia (100 percent) and 172 (out of 202) in the Czech 
Republic. The respondents are allocated among the regions as follows: in Slovakia 47 percent 
in the West Slovakia, 16 percent in the Middle Slovakia and 37 percent in the East Slovakia; 
in the Czech Republic 31 percent in the Southern Moravia (Region 1), 48 percent in the 
Middle Bohemia (Region 2) and 21 percent in the Highlands (Region 3). 
Tables 2, 3 and 4 present some characteristics of the respondents, of their relationship with 
the corporate farm in which they rent out their land, and of the rented plots respectively. In 
both countries the respondents are relatively aged (59 and 62 on average in Slovakia and the 
Czech Republic respectively), mainly retired, with a completed high school. Very few of them 
farm some land individually outside the corporate farm. The respondents in Slovakia seem to 
have closer contacts with their corporate farm compared to the Czech respondents: a smaller 
percentage live more than 50 km away from the corporate farm; they have been in relation 
with the farm for a longer period (18 years compared to 11 years in the Czech Republic); 
almost half of them have more than two contacts per year with the farm management (against 
13 percent in the Czech sample); the majority collect their rent on site (while the majority of 
the Czech respondents receive it by mail or bank transfer); more Slovak than Czech 
respondents know their fellow landowners in the corporate farm. These differences might be 
due to the survey procedure. The face-to-face interviews in Slovakia might have captured 
more respondents in the vicinity of the corporate farms and less absentee landowners. 
Regarding the plots rented out by the respondents, the average size is small: 1.9 ha in 
Slovakia and 0.6 ha in the Czech Republic. The inheritance law in both countries allows land 
to be split between heirs and is a source of land ownership fragmentation. The respondents 
usually rent out several plots to the same corporate farm: 2.4 on average in Slovakia and 6.6 
on average in the Czech Republic. It should be noted that in Slovakia the respondents were 
asked about the characteristics of their plots with a maximum number of 4 plots on the answer 
sheet, while in the Czech Republic the respondents had to state the exact number of plots they 
had in their ownership. Summing up the area of individual plots indicates that the total area 
per landowner rented out to the corporate farm is similar for both samples, around 4 ha. The 
annual average rent per hectare received by the respondents in Slovakia is 11.5 euro and in the 
Czech Republic 36.5 euro. This is a low level for Slovakia but higher than the national 
average in the Czech Republic (on average, 22 euro in the Czech corporate farms in 2003; 
VUZE, 2004). However, in both countries the rent is much lower than in the EU-15 (e.g. in 
2002 in France 115 euro; Agreste, 2002). 
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Table 2: Characteristics of the sample landowners  
 Slovakia Czech Republic 
Age 
Average age 
 
59.2 
 
61.6 
Education 
Share of respondents having completed (%): 
primary school only 
high school or other vocational school 
university 
 
 
16 
59 
25 
 
 
30 
57 
13 
Activity 
Share of respondents (%): 
employed 
retired 
other 
 
 
42 
53 
5 
 
 
34 
55 
11 
Distance from the corporate farm 
Share of respondents living (%): 
less than 50 km away 
more than 50 km away 
 
 
93 
7 
 
 
80 
20 
Private farming 
Share of respondents farming individually (%) 
Average area farmed (ha) 
Average area owned (ha) 
 
5 
39.1 
16.8 
 
1 
69.6 
16.5 
Table 3: Characteristics of the relationship between the sample landowners and their 
corporate farm 
 Slovakia Czech Republic 
Relation duration 
Average number of years the respondents have been in relation 
with the farm 
 
18.3 
 
10.6 
Number of contacts 
Share of respondents having, per year (%): 
0 face-to-face contact with the farm 
1 face-to-face contact with the farm 
2 face-to-face contacts with the farm 
more than 2 face-to-face contacts with the farm 
 
 
6 
31 
21 
42 
 
 
25 
48 
14 
13 
Payment of rent 
Share of respondents having their rent paid by (%): 
collecting it on site 
receiving it otherwise (mail, bank transfer) 
 
 
67 
33 
 
 
31 
59 
Knowledge of the other landowners 
Share of respondents knowing the farm’s other landowners (%): 
knowing none of them 
knowing some of them 
knowing all of them 
 
 
8 
87 
5 
 
 
35 
62 
3 
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Table 4: Characteristics of the plots rented out by the sample landowners to corporate 
farms 
 Slovakia Czech Republic 
Number of plots per landowner 
Average number of plots per landowner 
Maximum number of plots of a landowner 
 
2.4 
4* 
 
6.6 
44 
Plot type (%) 
arable 
grassland 
other 
 
60 
37 
3 
 
67 
27 
6 
Plot size 
Average area of a plot (ha) 
Largest plot per landowner; sample’s average (ha) 
 
1.9 
2.7 
 
0.6 
3.4 
Total per landowner (all plots) 
Average total area rented by landowners (ha)  
Average annual rent per ha (euro) 
 
4.10 
11.5 
 
4.08 
36.5 
* The questionnaire limited the information to 4 plots. 
3.4. Analysis of the survey responses 
3.4.1. Stated change of behaviour following the introduction of the CAP payments 
Table 5 provides information about the past behaviour of the respondents regarding rent 
renegotiations and land withdrawals. Very few of the respondents asked for a rent increase in 
the past two years (4 percent in Slovakia, 1 percent in the Czech Republic) or withdrew some 
of their land in the past five years (5 percent in Slovakia, 2 percent in the Czech Republic). 
This provides support to the Proposition 1 that the status quo was the most frequent strategy 
in the past. The last row of Table 5 details the reason for the choice of status quo. Most of the 
respondents have never considered to ask for a rent increase or to withdraw their land because 
there were no better opportunities elsewhere for their land (in terms of renting out to another 
farm, selling land, farming it individually). This is consistent with the low share of 
respondents who had a higher rent offered in the past (1 and 6 percent in Slovakia and the 
Czech Republic respectively). More have had offers for purchase of their land (one third of 
the sample in the Czech Republic), but the prices proposed might have been too low since 
most of them did not sell land. Another common reason for not withdrawing land in the past 
is that the landowners stated that they preferred to have their land managed by somebody else. 
Very few respondents mentioned difficulties with the identification of their plot within the 
corporate farm field or with a substitute plot proposed by the farm. Regarding those who 
asked for a rent increase in the past, most of them did so because they believed that the rentals 
had been increased for some of the other landowners, rather than because they were able to 
impose a credible threat of withdrawing. Almost no request for a rent increase had been 
accepted by the corporate farms justifying this by financial constraints. Respondents who 
withdrew some land from the corporate farms in the past needed it to farm individually in 
Slovakia and sell it in the Czech Republic. 
Table 6 reports the landowners’ intentions within a five year horizon in the CAP context. The 
respondents were first briefed about the modalities of the SAP. Few of them were well 
informed (e.g. 22 percent in the Czech Republic), which indicates a problem with the 
dissemination of information about the CAP implementation. The landowners were then 
asked whether the introduction of SAP would change their behaviour towards the corporate 
farm in which they were renting land. Although the majority claimed that their behaviour 
would not be influenced (79.8 and 69.8 percent in Slovakia and the Czech Republic 
respectively), these shares are smaller than the shares of landowners who opted for the status 
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quo before the introduction of the CAP. This supports Proposition 2. Only few of the 
respondents would consider to withdraw their land (13.6 percent in Slovakia, 10.4 in the 
Czech Republic), supporting Proposition 3. The respondents justified their choice for the 
continuation of the status quo by the preference to have their land managed by somebody else. 
Having in mind the high age of the respondents this is not surprising. The other common 
reasons were that there were still no better opportunities for their land outside the corporate 
farm, in particular that the amount of SAP was not large enough to cover the costs of 
withdrawing land and producing on it or keeping it in GAEC. The respondents who intend to 
withdraw land mainly plan to sell it. Few are considering keeping their land in GAEC only, 
and even fewer to use their land for farm production. This is not surprising, as in order to 
receive the SAP, at least 1 ha of land must be operated, while the landowners have mainly 
smaller plots. 
3.4.2. Factors affecting landowners’ intentions 
Merged sample (both countries) 
One important issue is to understand the underlying reasons behind the landowners’ choice 
for status quo or asking for a rent increase, rather than withdrawing from the corporate farm. 
To investigate the determinants of landowners’ intentions, a multinomial logit is used. This 
allows understand the factors that influence the probability of choosing an option in relation 
to the other options. The logit has been performed on a merged sample including the 
Slovakian and Czech respondents in order to investigate which of the determinants are 
common to both countries. The dependent variable is categorical and takes the value 2 if 
landowners intend to withdraw their land, 1 if they intend to ask for a rent increase and 0 if 
they would prefer no change (the latter is taken as a reference). The factors potentially 
affecting the behaviour were identified based on the body of literature about farm 
individualisation during transition. Several studies have explored the factors affecting the 
choice of individuals to exit the former state and collective farms after the fall of the central 
planning. The main factors relate to landowners’ social characteristics and capital endowment 
(Rizov et al., 2001), and to the risk of farming (Mathijs and Swinnen, 1998). Social capital, 
i.e. networks and trust (Putnam, 1993), has also been found to play an important role in the 
success of agriculture during transition (Slangen et al., 2004). 
Several models were tested and the selection was based on the goodness of fit statistics 
(significance of the model; R-square; percentages of correct predictions). The final 
specification of the logit model includes two social characteristics, the landowners’ age and a 
dummy taking the value 1 if they have secondary or tertiary education. It is expected that 
older landowners have weaker incentives to change their current situation and that highly 
educated landowners would be more informed about the CAP and thus more prone to ask for 
a rent increase. Social capital is treated in regard to the relationship that landowners have with 
the corporate farms’ management. It is proxied, first, by the number of years that both parties 
have been in relation with each other and, second, by a dummy taking the value 1 if the 
landowner has more than one contact per year with the farm. The influence of these variables 
is ambiguous. Landowners who have a distant link with the farm might have less opportunity 
or desire to change their current situation. However, landowners with a close relationship 
might also be less likely to change their contract as they might know precisely the reasons 
behind the level of rent they receive. Besides these landowners’ variables, two land 
characteristics are included: the total area rented out per landowner in hectares and the annual 
rent per hectare in euro. The expectation is that the larger the area owned by the landowner, 
the more likely they would withdraw their land as the SAP might cover the accompanying 
costs. As for the rent, intuitively the higher the rent, the more satisfied the landowners are, 
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and thus they are less likely to move away from the status quo. Finally, a dummy equal to 1 
for the Czech landowners and 0 for the Slovak landowners is included. The correlations 
between all the explanatory variables were checked using the Pearson coefficients, but they 
were sufficiently low. (In particular, the coefficient between the age of the respondents and 
their length of relationship with the farm was only 0.25.) 
As shown in Table 7, the model goodness-of-fit statistics are satisfying, including a correct 
share of predictions of 73.4 percent. Regarding the influence of the explanatory variables, 
Table 7 indicates that the social characteristics (age and education) have no influence on the 
intention to change, but the contact with the farm plays a role. Landowners who have frequent 
contact with the farm management are more likely to keep their status quo. Moreover, the 
longer the landowners have been in contact with the management, the less likely it is that they 
would opt for withdrawing their land. This suggests that managers who keep a close and 
established relationship with their landowners are less likely to experience massive 
withdrawals of land. The landowners’ future behaviour is not influenced by the area that they 
rent out. This might be explained by the fact that almost universally the land areas are small. 
However, the lower the level of rent that they currently receive, the more likely is that they 
will ask for a rent increase or withdraw land. Finally, the country dummy reveals that 
especially in the Czech Republic landowners are more likely to renegotiate their rent than to 
withdraw.  
This last point which underlines the differences between the two countries deserves a more 
extensive discussion. In both countries there are heavy distortions to the land market brought 
about by several factors, including unfinished land reforms. In the Czech Republic, there are 
more impediments to the withdrawal of land from the corporate farms than in Slovakia. In the 
Czech Republic, not only are the physical boundaries of the individual plots not demarcated 
on the fields, but also the land cadastral maps are not completed. In Slovakia, there are no 
physical identifications of the plots on the fields and there is a need for additional surveys, but 
at least the maps have been completed. Besides this, the Slovakian landowners might think 
that there is not a margin to renegotiate rental contracts. In the Czech Republic, there is no 
reference to any official land price set for tax purposes when fixing the rent. In Slovakia, the 
Act on Land Lease (No 504/2003 Coll., par. 10) sets a minimum land rent price at 1 percent 
of the administrative price, and, although there are no legal requirements regarding a 
maximum price, in practice it is believed that rentals are brought into alignment with the low 
price charged by the Slovak Land Fund for the state-owned land (1.5 percent of the 
administrative price of land). As explained in IDEMA Deliverable 9, the lack of flexibility 
might also be felt with regard to the time period of the rental contract which is set by the law 
to 5 or 20 years in Slovakia. In contrast, in the Czech Republic the terms are left to mutual 
agreement and the period of the contract can be shorter. All this might have influenced the 
intentions of the landowners in the two countries. 
Additional analysis of the Czech sample 
In the Czech Republic the questionnaire included four additional pieces of information. The 
first aspect deals with the characteristics of the contract: whether the contract is for a fixed or 
indefinite period (indefinite for 42 percent of the respondents); whether the contract can be 
terminated by the landowners before its end by a notice and what is the termination notice 
period (60 percent of the respondents indicated that they can terminate the contract); and 
whether the rent level is fixed for the contract duration (the case of 54 percent of the 
respondents). Intuitively, it can be assumed that the landowners who have less contractual 
flexibility will be less likely to ask for a rent increase. Dummies accounting for this 
information were included in a multinomial logit applied to the Czech respondents’ answers. 
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The second aspect concerns the possible dual position of the landowners in the corporate 
farm: they were asked whether in addition to being a factor owner they were a 
shareholder/partner/member (the case of 13 percent of the respondents) or an employee (3 
percent of the respondents). It might be expected that landowners who are more involved in 
the farm and receive other returns (dividends or wages) are less likely to put the farm’s 
survival at risk and therefore more likely to maintain the status quo regarding their land. Two 
dummies representing these dual situations were included in the logit for the Czech Republic. 
The third aspect concerns the competition for land in the area. In the past 34 percent of the 
Czech sample were offered to sell their land. They did not sell for various reasons (e.g. low 
price, difficult access to the plot), however, this might have given them a signal for existing 
opportunities. A dummy equal to 1 if the landowner has been proposed to sell their land in the 
past and 0 otherwise was included in the model. Finally, the fourth aspect relates to the 
application of the land consolidation programme. The landowners who benefit from the land 
consolidation have a stronger bargaining position in the rent renegotiation process as their 
land can be easier to withdraw. So far, 13 percent of the Czech respondents have benefited 
from the land consolidation. A dummy equal to 1 if this is the case and equal to 0 otherwise 
was included in the logit model. The dummies accounting for the characteristics of the rental 
contract and for the employee or shareholder status of the landowners did not have significant 
influence on the intentions and reduced the model’s goodness-of-fit. They were removed from 
the final specification. 
Table 8 presents the model results. They confirm the merged sample’s findings that a close 
relation with the farm induces less rent renegotiations and withdrawals, and that the higher the 
rent received, the less likely are the landowners to ask for a rent increase or withdraw. As 
expected, the landowners who have received an offer for purchase of their land in the past are 
more likely to withdraw. Land consolidation creates also a strong incentive (dummy 
significant at 1 percent level) to withdraw land. 
Influence of the regional location 
Intended behaviour might differ the between the regions within a country due to some specific 
features of each region (economic development, dynamism, agricultural performance). The 
application of a multinomial logit to individual countries did not provide important insights 
and therefore only frequencies are presented here. 
Table 9 presents the share of respondents according to their intention in each of the three 
regions in the Czech Republic. There are two interesting observations. First, in the Highlands 
the landowners are more “dynamic”, in the sense that this sub-sample has the lowest share of 
respondents opting for a future status quo (50 percent of the region’s respondents), while the 
sub-sample in the Middle Bohemia has the largest share of the status quo preferences (74.6 
percent). Second, in the Southern Moravia the landowners are more likely to withdraw their 
land (21.4 percent of the region’s respondents), while this is the least likely in the Middle 
Bohemia (4.5 percent). 
In order to understand the reasons behind these differences ANOVA was performed. The 
analysis allows assessing whether there is a significant difference in the characteristics of the 
sub-groups. The results are presented in Table 10. They show two important features. In 
Region 2 (Middle Bohemia) the rent received by the respondents is much higher than in the 
two other regions, reflecting the economic wealth of the area due to the proximity to Prague. 
This is consistent with the finding that in this region the landowners are the most likely to opt 
for maintaining the status quo in future. The second obvious difference between the regions 
concerns the implementation of land consolidation. Half of the Region 3 (Highlands) sub-
sample’s cadastres have been subject to land consolidation, while the share is only between 2 
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and 4 percent in the other regions. This might be the main reason why the respondents in 
Region 3 appear to be the most likely to change their situation by asking for a rent increase or 
withdrawing their land. The reason for the highest intended withdrawals in Region 1 
(Southern Moravia) might lie in the relation with the farm. In this region landowners have the 
least frequent contacts with their farm and few of them have other ties with the farm (being 
shareholder, partner, member, employee). 
Slovakia also presents regional differences. For example, moving from west to east means 
worse agricultural and economic conditions. It is therefore expected that the landowners in the 
west have better opportunities for their land and are more likely to withdraw than those in the 
east. Table 11 displays the respondent’s intentions regarding their land according to the 
region. As expected, the largest share of withdrawal intentions is found in the west (20.9 
percent of the west respondents compared to 11.9 percent of the east respondents). However, 
surprisingly, it is in the Middle Slovakia that the landowners are all fully satisfied with their 
situation and do not intend to ask for a rent increase or to withdraw (100 percent choose the 
status quo). The small area available for withdrawing by landowners in Middle Slovakia 
might explain this. ANOVA analysis results, presented in Table 12, indicate that the highest 
rent is paid in West Slovakia, while the lowest in East Slovakia. The low prevailing rent in 
East Slovakia might reflect the economic situation of the region and thus the low 
opportunities for better returns. 
The regional analysis suggests that there are important differences stemming from the general 
economic development in the regions. Corporate farms in the lagging behind regions, 
particularly with insufficient land consolidation, may not be exposed to credible threat of 
withdrawals as the opportunities for better returns on land ownership outside the corporate 
farms are very limited.   
 
 
 
Table 5: Past behaviour of sample landowners concerning their land 
 Slovakia Czech Republic 
Competition from other farms 
Respondent having had a higher rent offered by another farm in the past 2 years (%) 
Respondent having had an offer for purchase of their land in the past 2 years (%) 
 
1 
NA 
 
6 
34 
General past behaviour 
Share of respondent who (%): 
Category 1- asked for a rent increase in the past 2 years 
Category 2- withdrew land in the past 5 years 
Category 3- never considered renegotiating or withdrawing in the past 5 years 
 
 
4 
5 
40 
 
 
1 
2 
78 
1- Past rent increase 
Reason for asking (share of respondents in Category 1 in %): 
able to get a higher rent elsewhere 
heard that other landowners in this farm had their rent increased 
other 
Average increase asked for (% of the current rent) 
Share of requests that were accepted (share of respondents in Category 1in %) 
Reason for refusal from the corporate farm (share of the respondents refused in %): 
farm could not afford it 
other 
 
 
14 
57 
29 
87 
14 
 
100 
0 
 
 
50 
50 
0 
53 
0 
 
NA 
NA 
2- Past withdrawals 
Reason for withdrawing (share of respondents in Category 2 in %): 
not happy with the rent level 
wanted to start own farm 
wanted to sell land 
other 
Average area withdrawn (ha) 
Use of the land after withdrawal (share of respondents in Category 2 in %): 
individual farming 
sold 
Other 
 
 
56 
100 
0 
0 
16 
 
78 
0 
0 
 
 
0 
0 
75 
0 
1 
 
0 
100 
0 
3- Past status quo 
Reason for not asking for a rent increase (share of respondents in Category 3 in %): 
thought not possible to get it 
rent was appropriate or increased without asking for it 
the contract specifies that the rent cannot be increased 
other 
 
 
42 
12 
2 
0 
 
 
8 
39 
22 
1 
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Reason for not withdrawing (share of respondents in Category 3 in %): 
rent satisfactory or increased 
no opportunity for a higher rent elsewhere 
too risky or unprofitable to farm individually 
easier to have land managed by somebody else 
to be part of a corporate farm matches own values and beliefs 
to be part of the corporate farm gives other benefits 
other 
 
18 
34 
57 
65 
47 
14 
7 
 
13 
36 
20 
35 
20 
7 
3 
 
NA: not available (the question was not included in the questionnaire for this country). 
The respondents were free to choose several reasons for their past behaviour. Therefore, the numbers do not sum to 100. 
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Table 6: Intended future behaviour of the sample landowners concerning their land 
 Slovakia Czech Republic 
Future options (within the next 5 years) 
Share of respondents who intend to (%): 
Category 1- ask for a rent increase 
Category 2- withdraw land 
Category 3- no change  
 
 
7 
14 
80 
 
 
20 
10 
70 
2- Future withdrawals 
Reasons (share of respondents in Category 2 in %): 
to rent the land out to another farm 
to produce on it individually 
to maintain it individually in GAEC 
to sell it 
Other 
 
 
36 
0 
24 
64 
16 
 
 
11 
6 
11 
72 
0 
3- Future status quo 
Reasons (share of respondents in Category 3 in %): 
SAP too low to compensate for the risk of individual farming 
SAP too low to compensate for the costs of maintaining the land in GAEC 
impossible to have a higher rent elsewhere 
current rent satisfactory 
easier to have the land managed by somebody else 
to be part of the corporate farm matches own values and beliefs 
to be part of the corporate farm gives other benefits 
Other 
 
 
39 
39 
31 
9 
62 
50 
16 
7 
 
 
12 
12 
12 
9 
36 
17 
3 
3 
Sale of land 
Share of respondents considering selling their land within the next 5 years (%) 
To whom preferably (share of respondents considering selling %): 
corporate farm where currently renting out 
on the market to the highest bidder 
 
21 
 
11 
100 
 
40 
 
35 
58 
The respondents were free to choose several reasons for their intentions for the future. Therefore, the numbers do not sum to 100. 
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Table 7: Multinomial logit: Sample landowners’ intention within the next 5 years in the Czech Republic and Slovakia (a merged sample) 
 Intend to ask for rent increase (1) Intend to withdraw land (2) 
Variable Parameter Significance Parameter Significance 
Intercept 
Age 
High education, dummy 
Length of relationship with the farm 
Frequent contact, dummy 
Total area rented out to the farm 
Annual rent received 
Czech Republic, dummy 
-3.250 
-0.005 
-0.413 
-0.034 
-1.444 
0.040 
-0.017 
1.162 
** 
 
 
 
*** 
 
* 
** 
-0.644 
-0.005 
-0.674 
-0.047 
-0.665 
0.048 
-0.021 
-0.024 
 
 
 
** 
* 
 
* 
Pearson Chi-square 42.4 *** 
Nagelkerke R-square 0.18 
Percentage of correct predictions 73.4 
Number of valid observations 282 
The reference category (0) includes those landowners who neither intend to renegotiate their rent nor withdraw their land. 
*, **, *** denotes significance at 10, 5, 1 percent level. 
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Table 8: Multinomial logit: sample landowners’ intention within the next 5 years in the Czech Republic  
 Intend to ask for rent increase (1) Intend to withdraw land (2) 
Variable Parameter Significance Parameter Significance 
Intercept 
Length of relationship with the farm 
Frequent contact, dummy 
Annual rent received 
Received offers got land purchase in the past, dummy 
Land consolidation programme, dummy 
-0.543 
-0.096 
-1.392 
-0.019 
-0.104 
1.115 
 
* 
** 
* 
 
1.098 
-0.031 
-1.508 
-0.035 
-1.927 
2.321 
 
 
* 
** 
*** 
*** 
Pearson Chi-square 31.3 *** 
Nagelkerke R-square 0.30 
Percentage of correct predictions 69.4 
Number of valid observations 111 
The reference category (0) includes those landowners who intend neither to renegotiate their rent nor withdraw their land. 
*, **, *** denotes significance at 10, 5, 1 percent level. 
 
 
Table 9: Future behaviour of the sample landowners by region in the Czech Republic 
 Region 1 
(Southern Moravia) 
Region 2 
(Middle Bohemia) 
Region 3 
(Highlands) 
Number of surveyed landowners 42 67 32 
Share of respondents within the next 5 years who due to SAP intend to (%): 
1- ask for a rent increase 
2- withdraw land 
3- no change 
 
24 
21 
55 
 
21 
5 
75 
 
31 
19 
50 
 
 22 
Table 10: Sample landowners profile per region in the Czech Republic  
 Region 1 
(Southern Moravia) 
Region 2 
(Middle Bohemia) 
Region 3 
(Highlands) 
ANOVA F-test 
Average rent per ha (euro) 15.9 59.6 13.8 55.0 *** 
Average total area rented (ha) 5.0 3.8 3.5 0.8 
Average size of a rented plot (ha) 0.3 0.9 0.5 5.6 *** 
Relationship with the farm (years) 11.8 9.5 11.6 3.6 ** 
Share of respondents having, per year (%): 
0 or 1 face-to-face contact with the farm management 
2 face-to-face contacts with the farm management 
more than 2 face-to-face contacts with the farm management 
 
80 
10 
10 
 
70 
17 
13 
 
70 
12 
18 
 
0.8 
Share of respondents living (%): 
less than 50 km away 
more than 50 km away 
 
81 
19 
 
82 
18 
 
76 
24 
 
0.3 
Average age 61.8 62.4 59.6 0.6 
Share of respondents (%): 
employed 
retired 
other 
 
30 
63 
7 
 
35 
50 
15 
 
36 
53 
11 
 
0.1 
Share of respondents having completed (%): 
primary school only 
high school or other vocational school 
university 
 
43 
6 
51 
 
22 
11 
67 
 
29 
29 
42 
 
4.2 ** 
Share of respondents being in the corporate farm (%): 
shareholder/partner/member 
employee 
 
25 
20 
 
40 
40 
 
35 
40 
 
1.2 
0.6 
Share of respondents whose cadastre has been subject to land 
consolidation (%) 
 
4 
 
2 
 
50 
 
41.4 *** 
Share of respondents who have received a purchase offer for 
their land in the past (%) 
 
36 
 
34 
 
30 
 
15.8 *** 
*, **, *** denotes significance at 10, 5, 1 percent level. 
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 West Slovakia Middle Slovakia East Slovakia ANOVA F-test 
Average rent per ha (euro) 17.0 8.3 5.1 20.2 *** 
Average total area rented (ha) 4.2 2.5 4.7 5.6 *** 
Average size of a rented plot (ha) 1.8 2.5 1.8 3.3 ** 
Relationship with the farm (years) 17.2 12.2 22.9 11.2 *** 
Share of respondents having, per year (%): 
0 or 1 face-to-face contact with the farm 
2 face-to-face contacts with the farm 
more than 2 face-to-face contacts with the farm 
 
46 
13 
41 
 
33 
10 
57 
 
25 
38 
37 
 
1.4 
Share of respondents living (%): 
less than 50 km away 
more than 50 km away 
 
93 
7 
 
80 
20 
 
99 
1 
 
5.1 *** 
Average age 61.0 59.2 56.9 2.3 * 
Share of respondents (%): 
employed 
retired 
other 
 
41 
57 
2 
 
40 
57 
3 
 
46 
46 
8 
 
0.1 
Share of respondents having completed (%): 
primary school only 
high school or other vocational school 
University 
 
20 
54 
26 
 
10 
80 
10 
 
13 
57 
30 
 
0.9 
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 West Slovakia Middle Slovakia East Slovakia 
Number of surveyed landowners 86 30 67 
Share of respondents within the next 5 years who due to SAP intend to (%): 
1- ask for a rent increase 
2- withdraw land 
3- no change 
 
11 
21 
69 
 
0 
0 
100 
 
5 
12 
83 
Table 11: Future behaviour of the sample landowners by region in Slovakia 
 
Table 12: Sample landowners profile per region in Slovakia  
 
*, **, *** denotes significance at 10, 5, 1 percent level. 
 
4. The survey of corporate farms 
4.1. The questionnaire 
As already mentioned, the survey of corporate farms in Slovakia was carried out 
within the frame of the main IDEMA farm survey. The questionnaire, the description 
of the sample and the analysis of the survey data are presented in Deliverable 14. Here 
only these sections that relate to the cross-checking of the answers of the landowners 
and the analysis of the potential conflicts between the stakeholders concerning profit 
allocation are discussed. As argued in the introduction, the specificity of corporate 
farms is their complex organisation involving several stakeholders. In order to 
understand which are the stakeholders that would mainly benefit from the SAP, 
questions were first asked about the current farm decision-making characteristics 
(number of members/partners, directors and managers; and voting procedure in 
cooperatives). Then the respondents were asked how the farm profit used to be 
allocated and how they intend to allocate it in the future amongst the alternative needs 
(working capital, investment/interest, dividends and land rentals).  
One section of the farm questionnaire focused on the potential conflicts between the 
farms’ managers and their landowners from the point of view of the farm 
management. The first questions aimed at collecting information about the 
characteristics of the landowners (e.g. individuals, state, municipality), the area 
rented, the rent level and the terms of the contract. Then the respondents were asked 
whether some of their landowners had asked for a rent increase in the past, or 
withdrew some land, and whether the corporate farm management knew whether their 
landowners had been offered a higher rent outside the corporate farm. Finally, the 
questionnaire asked about the opinion of the corporate farms’ respondents on the 
potential behaviour of their landowners in the context of the introduction of the CAP 
payments. 
The survey respondents were asked to state their role in the farm (director, manager or 
other), as this might bias the answers. 
As described in Deliverable 14, the face-to-face survey was implemented in the 
autumn 2005. One hundred and fifty two corporate farms were interviewed in 
Slovakia, including 101 cooperatives and 51 companies. 
4.2. Analysis of the survey responses 
4.2.1. Relation with the landowners 
Table 13 presents information about the landowners who rent their land to the 
corporate farms surveyed. It also presents the average land area of the surveyed farms 
provided by their FADN records. As the rent level is a key variable in the analysis, it 
is presented in the table from two sources – FADN and the farm survey. 
The farms have hundreds of private landowners owning on average 68 percent of the 
total land rented in by the sample corporate farms. On average 24 percent of the land 
is rented from the State and the remaining 8 percent from the Church and 
municipalities. The companies rent more from the State than the cooperatives. The 
land rented in from private landowners is more fragmented in the cooperatives than in 
the companies. The average rent paid indicated by both FADN records and 
respondents is about 14 euro per ha (the cooperatives pay a lower rent than the 
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companies). This rent level is consistent with the responses by the landowners within 
the individual landowners’ survey.   
Table 13: Characteristics of the sample farms concerning their rented land 
 All farms 
(152) 
Cooperatives 
(101) 
Companies 
(51) 
FADN 2002 data 
Average UAA (ha) 1,866 1,904 1,791 
Average rent per ha (euro) 14.3 12.9 17.0 
Data from the survey 
Average share of land rented from: 
Private landowners (%) 
State (%) 
Other (%) 
 
68 
24 
8 
 
73 
21 
6 
 
58 
32 
10 
Average number of private landowners 789 877 612 
Size of private landowners’ plots:  
Average (ha) 
Smallest (ha) 
Largest (ha) 
 
2.8 
0.7 
43 
 
1.7 
0.15 
27 
 
5 
1.7 
75 
Average rent per ha: 
Private landowners (euro) 
State land (euro) 
 
16.9 
12.9 
 
14.7 
12.3 
 
21.2 
14.3 
Time period of contract 
Notice for contract termination 
In general 5 or 10 years 
In general 1 year 
 
In order to compare the past behaviour stated in the landowner survey, corporate 
farms respondents were asked whether some of their landowners had requested a rent 
increase or had withdrew some of their land in the past. Table 14 summarises the 
answers. About one third of the farms have had requests for a rent increase, but by 
only 8 percent of their landowners. Among these farms, 39 percent increased the rent; 
the remaining refused justifying their refusal by financial constraints. More farms 
were subject to withdrawals (59 percent of the sample) but by a few landowners (3.5 
percent of all landowners). On average 3 percent of the sample farm UAA was 
withdrawn accounting for about 2 ha per landowner. The large majority of the 
individuals who withdrew land wanted to start their own farm (85 percent). This is 
again consistent with the landowners’ survey in which 100 percent of the landowners 
who withdrew land in the past stated that they did this to start their own farm (see 
Table 5). The fact that only few landowners asked for a rent increase or withdrew 
land, as stated by the corporate farms’ respondents, supports the Proposition 1 
concerning the prevalence of the status quo options in the past. 
Comparing the legal forms, the main difference is that more companies (63 percent) 
than cooperatives (25 percent) accepted the requests for a rent increase. This might be 
explained by the larger returns generated by companies (see Deliverable 14, Chapter 
8), which make them more flexible. Another observation is that a smaller land area 
was withdrawn from the companies than from the cooperatives. This might relate to 
the above findings that the cooperatives were less able to meet their landowners’ 
demands for rent increases.  
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Table 14: Past behaviour of the sample farms landowners (% in brackets) 
 All farms 
(152) 
Cooperatives 
(101) 
Companies 
(51) 
Requests for a rent increase 
Farms that had requests for a 
rent increase 
51 (34) 32 (32) 19 (37) 
Landowners who requested a 
rent increase 
48 (8) 48 (5)  49(12) 
Reason given by landowners 
for the request 
able to get higher rent elsewhere; heard that other landowner had 
increase 
Farms that accepted to 
increase the rent a
20 (39) 8 (25) 12 (63) 
Financial constraint used by 
the other farms for refusing 
the request 
75 70 87 
Land withdrawals 
Farms who experienced 
withdrawals 
89 (59) 62 (61) 27 (53) 
Landowners who withdrew 27 (3.5) 27 (3.6) 25 (3.4) 
Total UAA withdrawn from 
the farm; ha (% of UAA) 
52 (3) 56 (3.5) 42 (1.9) 
Justification of withdrawal 
by the start of own farm 
85 82 93 
a In brackets: as a percentage of farms having had requests for a rent increase. 
Corporate farms’ respondents were then asked to give their opinion on the possible 
future behaviour of their landowners. As presented in Table 15, three quarters of the 
respondents expect some request for a rent increase, but few of them believe that land 
withdrawals will take place. This also supports Propositions 2 and 3 that the status 
quo option will be less frequent in future but that withdrawals of land from the 
corporate farms will not be massive. 
Table 15: Sample farms’ expectations about their landowners’ future behaviour 
(%) 
 All farms 
(152) 
Cooperatives 
(101) 
Companies 
(51) 
Share of farms that expect SAP to induce 
more landowners  to ask for a rent 
increase 
76 75 77 
Share of farms that expect SAP to induce 
more landowners to withdraw 
20 20 20 
In order to understand why respondents have different expectations about their 
landowners’ future behaviour, an ANOVA analysis is performed. The results are 
presented in Table 16. Farms whose respondents do not think that the SAP will 
change their landowners’ behaviour have already had a larger share of rentals in their 
cost of production structure (2.6 percent against 1.9 percent). Farms whose 
respondents believe that the SAP will give incentives to their landowners to withdraw 
rather than ask for a rent increase are more often located in unfavourable areas, have 
already experienced more withdrawals in the past and have a larger share of 
individual landowners in their land portfolio, meaning a larger share of landowners 
that can capture the SAP individually. 
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Table 16: Characteristics of the sample farms depending on their expectations 
about landowners’ future behaviour: ANOVA 
Landowners will change behaviour versus no change 
 Farms that expect SAP to 
induce more landowners to 
ask for  a rent increase or to 
withdraw 
(120 farms) 
Farms that expect SAP  to 
induce more landowners to 
opt for the status quo 
(32 farms) 
F-test 
Share of farms located in the Middle 
Slovakia (%) 
24 6 5.1 ** 
Average share of rentals in total costs 
(%)a
1.9 2.6 2.8 * 
Landowners will request a rent increase versus withdrawal 
 Farms that expect SAP to 
induce more landowners to 
ask for  a rent increase  
(91 farms) 
Farms that expect SAP to 
induce more landowners to 
withdraw land 
(29 farms) 
F-test 
Share of farms located in mountainous 
LFA a (%) 
14 28 2.7 * 
Share of farms which experienced 
withdrawals in the past 5 years (%) 
53 76 4.9 ** 
Average share of land rented in from 
private landowners (%) 
67 74 3.5 * 
a source FADN (2002). 
*, **, *** denotes significance at 10, 5, 1 percent level. 
The above analysis confirms the theoretical propositions and is consistent with the 
information gathered through the landowners’ survey. The main policy conclusion is 
that the SAP will induce more landowners to review their situation within the 
corporate farms and to try to capture the capitalisation of the SAP through higher 
rents. However, it is unlikely that they will massively withdraw their land from the 
corporate farms. Therefore, the expected behaviour of landowners does not put the 
very existence of the corporate farms under question, at least within the short- to mid-
term horizon. However, if this is true on average, financially constrained farms may 
quickly loose their capacity to compete for land in the conditions of increased demand 
which has started being observed in the NMS after the EU accession. Therefore, a 
substantial structural change might be expected within the corporate farm sector with 
a better allocation of land to the more efficient users.  
The next section broadens the analysis beyond the landowners to the other 
stakeholders by investigating the possible conflicting uses of the profit in corporate 
farms. The issue of profit allocation can also provide some additional insights into the 
relations between the farms and their landowners. 
4.2.2. Use of farm profit 
 
Past and intended future profit allocation 
Respondents were asked how the farm profit is allocated at the end of the year among 
the different alternative uses: to cover farm current expenses, investment in fixed 
assets, payment of dividends to shareholders, increase in land rent or other (including 
an increase in wages of hired labour and debt repayment). As shown in Table 17, in 
the past the profit was used first to finance the current expenses and then for 
investment. The increase of the rentals was the least used option by the sample farms 
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(only 5 percent of respondents). This confirms the above findings that few farms 
accepted their landowners’ requests for a rent increase on the grounds that they could 
not afford it. This is also consistent with the theoretical argument that when control 
and ownership are separated, managers may have an agenda of their own, often 
different from the one of factor owners.  
The respondents were also asked to rank the same options from the least probable to 
the most probable in future taking in consideration the SAP. Table 17 shows a strong 
dependency on the past behaviour; the preferences for the future appear to be similar 
to the past. The most favoured option is to finance the farm current operations, 
followed by investment. The increasing of the land rent is still the least preferred 
option. 
 
Table 17: Past and future use of profit by the sample farms 
 All farms 
(152) 
Cooperatives 
(101) 
Companies 
(51) 
Profit used for: 
(% of respondents who answered yes to an option) 
Farm current operations 63 64 61 
Investment 50 46 59 
Dividends 20 18 24 
Land rent increase 5 6 2 
Other 18 19 18 
Profit will be used for: 
(% of respondents who ranked an option as most probable) 
Farm current operations 71 71 69 
Investment 24 26 22 
Land rent increase 1 6 0 
Other 4 3 6 
ANOVA was carried out to disentangle the farm characteristics that may explain the 
variations in the farms’ decisions regarding the distribution of their profit. Only the 
statistically significant results are presented in Table 18 for the past profit allocation 
and Table 19 for the future allocation. Information presented in Table 18 suggests that 
those farms which in the past did not allocate any profit to investment have a higher 
share of livestock production in their output mix and they are farms that did not 
benefit much from investment subsidies. This tends to suggest that some of the 
variations were induced by policies which may have stimulated investments in certain 
types of production. These farms are also smaller measured by the land area and pay a 
lower rent to their landowners. Table 18 also indicates that the only significant 
difference between the cohorts of farms that used part of their profit to increase the 
land rent and the farms that did not allocate any profit to rent increases lies in the type 
of owners (credible threat of land withdrawal) and the managers’ information about 
the type of landowners. Forty three percent of farms that used some profit for rent 
increases knew that some of their landowners had been offered a higher rent outside 
the corporate farms (against 18 percent for the farms that did not increase the rents). 
Regarding the intended future use of farm profit displayed in Table 19, farms that are 
less likely to reinvest profits have received a smaller amount of investment subsidies 
in the past (7.1 against 25.4 thousand euro). Farms that intend to allocate some of 
their profit to rent increases in the future have received in the past more other (i.e. not 
investment) subsidies per ha, which suggests that they might be less financially 
constrained. 
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Table 18: Characteristics of the sample farms depending on their past use of 
profit: ANOVA 
 Profit was used for investment  
 Farms that used profit for 
investment 
(76 farms) 
Farms that did not use profit 
for investment 
(76 farms) 
F-test 
UAA (ha) a 2,057 1,676 3.1 * 
Average rent per ha (euro) a 17.6 10.9 6.7 *** 
Average investment subsidies 
(thousand euro) a
17.9 5.2 3.1 * 
Average share of crop in the revenue 
from sales a (%) 
43 34 4.9 ** 
 Profit was used for rent increase  
 Farms that used profit for 
rent increase 
(7 farms) 
Farms that did not use profit 
for rent increase 
(145 farms) 
F-test 
Share of farms knowing that in the 
past some of their landowners were 
offered a higher rent 
 
43 
 
18 
 
3.0 * 
a Source FADN (2002). 
*, **, *** denotes significance at 10, 5, 1 percent level. 
 
 
Table 19: Characteristics of the sample farms depending on their intentions for 
the future use of profit: ANOVA 
 Profit will be used for investment  
 Farms that will most 
probably use profit for 
investment 
(37 farms) 
Farms that will less 
probably use profit for 
investment 
(114 farms) 
F-test 
Average investment subsidies 
(thousand euro) a
25.4 7.1 4.8 ** 
 Profit will be used for a rent increase  
 Farms that will most 
probably use profit for a 
rent increase 
(12 farms) 
Farms that will less 
probably use profit for a 
rent increase 
(139 farms) 
F-test 
Average subsidies per ha (excl. 
investment subsidies) (euro) a
 
123.6 
 
92.5 
 
2.9 * 
a Source FADN (2002). 
*, **, *** denotes significance at 10, 5, 1 percent level. 
Note: “Farms that will most probably use profit for investment” are those whose respondents 
ranked this option as 1 (the most likely); “Farms that will less probably use profit for 
investment” are those whose respondents ranked this option as 2, 3, 4, or 5 (5 is the least 
likely).  
“Farms that will most probably use profit for a rent increase” are those whose respondents 
ranked this option as 1 or 2 (most or relatively likely). “Farms that will less probably use 
profit for a rent increase” are those whose respondents ranked this option as 3, 4, or 5 (5 is the 
least likely). 
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The intention of the sample farms concerning their future profit allocation is also 
investigated according to the farm size. As explained in Deliverable 14, Chapter 8, the 
sample farms were split into two size groups, small and large, based on a cluster 
analysis. The analysis used five size characteristics from 2002 FADN: UAA in ha, 
labour in annual work units (AWU), value of capital stock, value of sales and value of 
total revenue including subsidies. Two clusters were identified by applying a two-step 
clustering process based on the log-likelihood distance (Table 20). 
 
Table 20: Cluster means according to farm size (FADN 2002 data) 
 Small farms  
(108 farms) 
Large farms 
(44 farms) 
UAA (ha) 1,241 3,400 
Labour (AWU) 45 142 
Capital (thousand euro) 1,811 6,682 
Sales (thousand euro) 497 1,994 
Revenue incl subsidies (thousand 
euro) 
608 2,345 
These clusters are used to investigate the differences in the intended use of future 
profits by farm size. As shown in Table 21, a larger share of small farms give priority 
to profit reinvestment, 27 percent, compared to the share of large farms of 19 percent. 
Differently, a larger share of large farms give the priority to the future use of profit for 
covering current expenditure (79 percent), compared to the share of small farms (68 
percent). More large farms than small ones intend to offer a rent increase (16 percent 
against 5 percent for the small farms). ANOVA reveals statistically significant 
differences in the average ranking of these three options by the size clusters. The 
differences in intentions regarding investment and current operations between the 
small and large farms are intuitive. The small farms would like to increase the size of 
their activities and thus plan to invest, while the large farms might have reached the 
efficient size but need to cover their day to day operation. Concerning the variations 
regarding the use of profit for rent increases, this might be explained by the fact that 
large farms rely more on rented land, and thus the potential land withdrawals could 
have more severe consequences for them than for the small farms. 
 
Table 21: Intended future use of profit by small and large farms: ANOVA 
 Small farms 
(108 farms) 
Large farms 
(44 farms) 
F-test 
Share of farms giving priority to (%)a 
investment 
current operations 
rent increase 
 
27 
68 
5 
 
19 
79 
16 
 
Average ranking of intended future use of profit for b 
investment 
current operations 
rent increase 
 
1.83 
1.47 
3.68 
 
2.12 
1.23 
3.37 
 
5.1 ** 
2.8 * 
5.2 ** 
a Farms are classified as giving priority to a particular option if they ranked the option as the 
most probable (rank 1) for investment and current operations, and the most or relatively 
probable (ranks 1 and 2) for rent increase. 
b Possible rankings are from 1 (the most likely) to 5 (the least likely). 
*, **, *** denotes significance at 10, 5, 1 percent level. 
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An interesting policy insight is provided by the study of the relation between the farm 
intentions for a future use of profit and their beliefs (or otherwise) in the irreversibility 
of decoupling. It is proposed that farm intentions concerning their future use of profit 
depend on whether farm managers/directors believe that the decoupling is a 
sustainable policy or they expect another policy switch, either towards coupled 
payments or to a full removal of farm support. First, as described in Deliverable 14, 
Chapter 8, the farms have been clustered according to the three credibility statements. 
The respondents were asked to rate these statements. The possible ratings were from 1 
“Not probable at all” to 6 “Very probable”. The statements 6.1.1 and 6.1.2 suggest 
respectively that the policy change towards a decrease in sectoral support and a move 
to less distortive instruments are credible, while the statement 6.1.3 suggests that the 
policy is not credible. A two-step cluster analysis based on likelihood was performed 
on the three credibility statements with the number of clusters restricted to three 
(Table 22). The Cluster “no payments” includes the farms which consider that the 
probability of full removal of payments is high (a high rating of the statement 6.1.2). 
The farms in the other two clusters think that payments are more likely to remain, but 
as decoupled, Cluster “decoupled payments” (a high rating of the statement 6.1.1), or 
that policy will revert to coupling, Cluster “coupled payments” (a high rating of the 
statement 6.1.3). 
 
Table 22: Cluster means according to credibility statements 
 
 
Cluster 
“decoupled 
payments” 
(88 farms) 
Cluster “no 
payments” 
(37 farms) 
Cluster 
“coupled 
payments” 
(27 farms) 
6.1.1. Payments decoupled from production but 
conditional on other service provision will be 
maintained. 
4.7 2.9 2.3 
6.1.2. Farmers will receive no support payments what 
so ever. 2.0 4.9 1.6 
6.1.3. Payments will be recoupled to agricultural 
production. 2.8 3.9 5.2 
 
The use of these clusters to investigate the differences in intended future profit 
allocation is presented in Table 23. Farms that do not think the decoupled payments 
are credible are more likely to use their profit for investment and less likely to use it 
for current operations. This means that they do not intend to change their behaviour as 
they think that the decoupled payments and GAEC are temporary policy instruments. 
The expectations for payments linked to production create incentives for investing. 
Concerning the use of profit for a rent increase, the farms that believe in the 
irreversibility of the 2003 CAP reform and the continuation of decoupled payments 
are more likely to give priority to land rentals in comparison with the farms expecting 
the payments to be recoupled or to disappear all together. This might indicate a 
perceived danger of landowners’ withdrawals under decoupling. 
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Table 23: Intended future use of profit by the sample farms according to their 
perception about policy credibility 
 Cluster 
“decoupled 
payments” 
(88 farms)  
Cluster “no 
payments” 
(37 farms) 
Cluster  
“coupled 
payments” 
(27 farms) 
Share of farms giving priority to (%) a 
investment 
current operations 
rent increase 
 
21 
74 
13 
 
22 
73 
3 
 
41 
59 
0 
a Farms are classified as giving priority to a particular option if they ranked the option as the 
most probable (rank 1) for investment and current operations, and the most or relatively 
probable (ranks 1 and 2) for rent increase. 
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5. Conclusions and implications 
The widespread existence of corporate farms in the NMS has raised doubts about their 
viability under the CAP direct payments, the so called Single Area Payments (SAP). 
The preference of the newly emergent landowners in the 1990s to leave their land in 
the corporate farms was linked to the low level of farm profitability and the high risk 
in the general economic environment. This was coupled with the fact that many city 
dwellers received land during the post-communist land reforms but did not have skills 
and experience in farm production and management. The accession to the EU and the 
introduction of the CAP support, and in particular the SAP, have improved the market 
conditions in the NMS and increased the farm incomes. The main question is whether 
under these circumstances the landowners would still prefer to leave their land in the 
corporate farms or whether a quick disintegration of these organisations will be 
witnessed. 
The negotiations between the corporate farm managers and the landowners 
concerning the rent level have been conceptualised as a simple two-player one-shot 
game. The propositions generated by the game, representing the negotiations between 
a corporate farm manager and an individual landowner, suggest that the SAP might 
induce more rent renegotiations but, overall, withdrawals will be infrequent. The 
analysis of the results from a survey of landowners who rent out land to corporate 
farms in Slovakia and the Czech Republic, and of a survey of corporate farms in 
Slovakia, finds support for these propositions. 
Several factors appear to be important if the corporate farms were to maintain their 
land base. The investigation of the determinants of the landowners’ behaviour 
indicates that while the current low rent level could increase the requests for rent 
renegotiations, what appears to be important in the landowners’ decision-making is 
the relationship between landowners and managers. The landowners who have 
frequent contacts and close relations with the farm are less likely to withdraw, 
indicating that their payoffs depend not only on the monetary returns from cashing the 
SAP but also on non-pecuniary characteristics. Therefore, those corporate farm 
managers who keep a close and established relationship with their landowners are less 
likely to experience massive withdrawals of land. 
Another important factor influencing the decision to withdraw from the corporate 
farms is the progress of the land consolidation programme. Land consolidation 
schemes started at the beginning of the transition in both Slovakia and the Czech 
Republic with the aim to facilitate the access to the individually owned plots and to 
reduce land fragmentation. The landowners who benefited from such schemes have 
obviously seen their bargaining power increased vis a vis the corporate farm 
management. However, the consolidation process has been very slow and therefore it 
is not expected that it will have a substantial impact on the landowners’ behaviour in 
the mid-term.  
There are variations in the corporate farms’ attitude toward rent increases. Overall, the 
corporate farm management rarely puts the land rent increase as a future priority.  
However, larger farms which are more dependent on numerous landowners give a 
higher priority to the use of future profits to reward land factor owners than the 
smaller farms do. Also, farms that trust the policy drive to decoupling and perceive 
the 2003 CAP reform as irreversible are keen to use the profit for rent increases. They 
realise that the decoupled payments that do not require production are easier to be 
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captured by the individual landowners, and that they have to share with the factor 
owners the increase in the value of land due to the capitalisation of support. This 
indicates a perceived danger of landowners’ withdrawals under decoupling. Farms 
that do not think the decoupled payments are credible are more likely to use their 
profit for investment. This means that they do not intend to change their behaviour as 
they think that the decoupled payments and GAEC are temporary policy instruments. 
The expectations for payments linked to production create incentives for investing.  
Overall, the main policy conclusion in this deliverable is that the SAP will induce 
more landowners to review their situation within the corporate farms and to try to 
capture the capitalisation of the SAP through higher rents. However, it is unlikely that 
they will massively withdraw their land from the corporate farms. Therefore, the 
expected behaviour of landowners does not put the very existence of the corporate 
farms under question, at least within the short- to mid-term horizon. However, if this 
is true on average, financially constrained farms may quickly loose their capacity to 
compete for land in the conditions of an increased land demand which has started 
being observed in the NMS after the EU accession. Therefore, a substantial structural 
change might be expected within the corporate farm sector with a better allocation of 
land to the more efficient users.  
A note of caution is required. Although this research does not suggest the existence of 
an imminent danger for the survival of corporate farms, so far the landowners have 
not been well informed about the modalities of the Single Area Payment Scheme. It is 
beyond doubt that, in parallel with the experience with the SAP implementation, more 
information will be made available through both formal and informal channels. This 
will be accompanied by the increase in the level of the SAP due to the phasing-in 
process. Therefore, the results from the current intention surveys might be an 
underestimation of the incentives of landowners to withdraw land from the corporate 
farms. Most probably, the demand for land will increase and the corporate farms will 
face a stronger competition for land and will be pressurised by the market forces to 
increase the rents.  
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 Map 1: Regions chosen for the landowners’ survey in Slovakia 
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Map 2: Regions chosen for the landowners’ survey in the Czech Republic 
 
 
 
 
District Abreviation Region 
Brno - venkov BV 1 
Břeclav BR 1 
Hodonín HO 1 
Vyškov VY 1 
Znojmo ZN 1 
Hradec Králové HK 2 
Kladno KL 2 
Litoměřice LT 2 
Jičín JC 2 
Mladá Boleslav MB 2 
Pardubice PA 2 
Havlíčkův Brod HB 3 
Chrudim CR 3 
Plzeň - sever PS 3 
Příbram PB 3 
Rakovník RA 3 
Strakonice ST 3 
Žďár nad Sázavou ZR 3 
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Appendix 1: Questionnaire to landowners in Slovakia 
 
1/ Your characteristics 
 
1.1. Your age: .................. years. 
 
1.2. Your formal education: 
 Primary school only 
 General high school 
 Special school 
 Special school with exit examination 
 University 
 
1.3. You are currently: 
 Employed 
 Retired 
 Unemployed 
 Other (please specify): ............................................................................................... 
 
1.4. How far from the corporate farm do you live in kilometres? 
 Less than 10 km 
 Between 10 and 50 km 
 Between 50 and 100 km 
 More than 100 km 
 
1.5. If you have your own farm, please answer the following table. If no, go to 
question 1.6. 
 
Since when have you been 
farming privately? 
.............................. 
How many hectares do you farm? ............................. ha 
How many hectares do you own? ............................. ha 
What is the main production?  Mainly crop production (please specify the 
percentage of crop production in your farm total 
revenue: ………… %) 
 Mainly livestock production (please specify the 
percentage of livestock production in your farm total 
revenue: ………… %) 
 Mixed 
 
1.6. How long have you been in relationship with management of the corporate farm? 
……………. years 
 
1.7. How many (professional or not professional) face-to-face contacts per year do 
you have with the management of the corporate farm? 
 0 
 1 
 2 
 More than 2 
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1.8. Do you know relatively well some other landowners of the corporate farm? 
 None of them 
 Some of them 
 All of them 
 
1.9. Please answer the following questions for each plot that you rent out to the 
corporate farm. 
 
 plot 1 plot 2 plot 3 plot 3 
How big is this plot?  
................. ha 
 
................. ha 
 
................. ha 
 
................. ha 
Please specify the type 
of land for each plot. 
 Arable 
 Grassland 
 Vine,orchard
 Other 
 Arable 
 Grassland 
 Vine,orchard
 Other 
 Arable 
 Grassland 
 Vine,orchard 
 Other 
 Arable 
 Grassland 
 Vine,orchard
 Other 
Since when are you the 
owner of this plot? 
 
.................... 
 
.................... 
 
.................... 
 
.................... 
Since when do you 
rent out this plot to the 
corporate farm? 
 
.................... 
 
.................... 
 
.................... 
 
.................... 
How much is the rent 
that you received last 
year for each plot 
(please specify the 
currency and for how 
many months the rent 
is stated) 
 
.................... 
.................... 
 
.................... 
.................... 
 
.................... 
.................... 
 
.................... 
.................... 
 
1.10. How is your rent usually paid? 
 You usually go to the corporate farm to collect your rent. 
 You usually get your rent in another way (by mail, bank transfer, etc). 
 Other (please specify):……………………………………………………………… 
 
1.11. According to you, for plots rented out to the corporate farm, how is the rent 
level established by the corporate farm? (you may tick several options) 
 The rent depends on the plot’s characteristics such as soil quality, location… 
 The rent depends on other parameters (please specify): ………………………… 
………………………………………………………………………………….. 
 
1.12. Have you been proposed a higher rent for your land elsewhere in the past 2 
years? 
 Yes 
 No 
 
1.13. If yes, who proposed you a higher rent? 
 Another corporate farm. 
 An individual farmer. 
 A farm managed by a foreigner. 
 Other (please specify): ............................................................................................ 
2/ Rent negotiation 
 
Please fill the column corresponding to your situation. If none of both situation applies to you, please go to part 3. 
  
Situation A  
In the past 2 years, you have asked for a rent increase. 
Situation B  
In the past 2 years, you have not asked for a rent increase but you have 
considered it. 
2.1.A. What was the reason for asking for a rent increase? (you may tick 
several options) 
 You were able to get a higher rent elsewhere. 
 You heard that other landowners in this corporate farm had their rent 
increased. 
 Other reason (please specify): 
.................................................................................. 
2.1.B. What was the reason for considering asking for a rent increase? 
(you may tick several options) 
 You were able to get a higher rent elsewhere. 
 You heard that other landowners in this corporate farm had their rent 
increased. 
 Other reason (please specify): 
.................................................................................. 
2.2.A. How much was the increase that you asked for approximately? 
(please specify whether the increase is stated in currency or in %) 
........................................................................ 
2.2.B. How much was the increase that you thought to ask for 
approximately? (please specify whether the increase is stated in 
currency or in %) ........................................................................ 
2.3.A. Was your request accepted? 
 yes 
 no 
If yes, go to section 3. 
2.4.A. If no, why was not your request accepted? (you may tick several 
options) 
 The corporate farm thought that your justification for rent increase 
was not adequate. 
 The corporate farm had not enough money to increase the rent. 
 Other (please specify): ……………………………………………. 
2.3.B. Why did not you ask for a rent increase? (you may tick several 
options) 
 You thought you would not get it. 
 You realised that the rent that you were receiving in the corporate 
farm was appropriate. 
 The corporate farm increased your rent without you asking for it. 
 Other (please specify): 
……………………………………………………………. 
2.5.A. What did you then do with your land?  
 You kept it in this corporate farm. 
 You withdrew it from the corporate farm. 
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3/ Land withdrawal 
 
Please fill the column corresponding to your situation. 
 
Situation A  
In the past 5 years, you have withdrawn land 
from this corporate farm or from another 
corporate farm. 
Situation B  
In the past 5 years, you have not withdrawn 
land from this corporate farm or from another 
corporate farm but you have considered it. 
Situation C  
In the past 5 years, you have never considered 
withdrawing land from this corporate farm or 
from another corporate farm. 
3.1.A. What were the reasons for withdrawing? 
(you may tick several options) 
 You were not happy with the level of rent. 
 You wanted to start your own farm. 
 Other (please specify): 
…………………………………………………
……. 
3.1.B. What were the reasons for considering 
withdrawing? (you may tick several options) 
 You were not happy with the level of rent. 
 You wanted to start your own farm. 
 Other (please specify): 
………………………………………………
………. 
3.2.A. How much in total did you withdraw from 
any corporate farm? 
………….. ha 
3.2.B. How much approximately in total did 
you consider withdrawing (from any 
corporate farm)? 
………….. ha 
3.3.A. What did you do with the land that you 
withdrew? (you may tick several options) 
 You rented it out to another farm. 
 You sold it. 
 You started your own farm. 
 You rented it back to the same corporate farm. 
 Other (please specify): ……………………… 
………………………………………………… 
3.3.B. Why did not you withdraw it? (you 
may tick several options) 
 You got a rent increase. 
 You realised that there was no other 
opportunity for a better rent elsewhere. 
 You were not happy with the land parcel 
proposed by the corporate farm. 
 You realised that it was too risky or not 
profitable to farm yourself your land. 
 Other (please specify): …………………… 
……………..……………………………… 
3.1.C. Why have you never considered 
withdrawing from a corporate farm? (you may 
tick several options) 
 It was easier to have your land managed by 
somebody else. 
 It was too risky or not profitable to farm your 
land privately. 
 There was no other opportunity for a better 
rent elsewhere. 
 You were happy with the level of rent that 
you were getting. 
 To be part of the corporate farm matches 
your own values and beliefs. 
 To be part of the corporate farm gives you 
other benefits outside the rent. 
 Other (please specify): ………………….. 
……………………………………………… 
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4/ The future 
 
4.1. In 2004 CAP direct payments have been introduced. These payments replace the former pre-accession payments and are given to farms with 
no obligation to produce as long as the land is kept in ‘good environmental and agricultural condition’. These payments consist of area payments 
per hectare and will increase in value over the next 8 years. Would this information make you change your behaviour over the next 5 years, in 
terms of withdrawing or asking for an increase of rent for the land that you rent out to this corporate farm? 
 
 yes  no 
4.1.A. What will you probably do in the next 5 years? (you may tick 
several options) 
 You will ask for a rent increase in the corporate farm. 
 You will withdraw your land from the corporate farm and rent it 
out elsewhere. 
 You will withdraw your land from the corporate farm and start or 
expand your own farm in order to receive the CAP direct payments. 
 You will withdraw your land from the corporate farm and keep it 
in ‘good environmental and agricultural condition’ in order to 
receive the CAP direct payments. 
 You will withdraw your land from the corporate farm and sell it. 
 Other (please specify): …………………………………………. 
4.1.B. Why not? (you may tick several options) 
 The CAP direct payments will not be high enough to compensate for the 
risk of private farming. 
  The CAP direct payments will not be high enough to compensate for the 
cost or maintaining your land in ‘good environmental and agricultural 
condition’. 
 You would not be able to get higher rent elsewhere. 
 You are happy with the level of rent that you get in the corporate farm. 
 It is easier to have your land managed by somebody else. 
 To be part of the corporate farm matches your own values and beliefs. 
 To be part of the corporate farm gives you other benefits outside the rent. 
 Other (please specify): ………………………………………….. 
 
4.2. Over the next 5 years, would you consider selling your land? 
 
 yes  no 
4.2.A. To whom preferably would you sell your land? (please tick one 
option only) 
 To the corporate farm where you are currently renting it out. 
 On the market to whoever proposes the highest price. 
 Other (please specify): …………………………………………. 
 
 
 
      
Appendix 2: Questionnaire to landowners in the Czech Republic 
 
 
 
1. Basic characteristics  
 
1.1. How big is the town (village) you have lived in? 
1 City with more than 100 000 inhabitants  
2 City or village from 10 000 up to 100 000 inhabitants 
3 City or village from 2 000 up to 10 000 inhabitants 
4 Village from 500 up to 2 000 inhabitants 
5 Village with less than 500 inhabitants 
 
1.2. If you (or your spouse) have your own farm, please answer the following table  
 
 
IF NO, GO TO QUESTION 1.3. 
1.1.1. Since when (year) have you been farming privately?        ………… 
1.1.2. How many hectares do you own? .............. ha 
1.1.3. How many hectares do you farm in total (included rented land)? .............. ha 
1.1.4. If you rent part of your land to another farm, please write down the 
acreage of this land. 
 
………...ha 
1.1.5. Please specify the percentage of particular productions in your 
total farm revenue.   
                 1 Crop production – share of total revenue: 
                   2 Livestock production – share of total revenue: 
 
………… % 
 
………… % 
 
1.3. To how many farms do you rent your land?  
1 One 
2 Two 
3 Three or more (then please indicate how many: ……….) 
 
1.4. Please specify number of hectares do you rent out to particular farms. 
 
If you are co-owner of the land, take into account only your ownership. 
Farm 1 Farm 2 Farm 3 Farm 4 Farm 5 
…………  ha …………  ha …………  ha …………  ha …………  ha
 
 
 
 
 
 
IF YOU RENT OUT YOUR LAND TO MORE THAN ONE FARM, PLEASE FILL 
IN THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS FOR THAT FARM WHICH YOU RENT OUT 
THE LARGEST PART OF YOUR LAND. 
1.5. How far from the corporate farm do you live? 
1 Less than 20 km 
2 Between 20 and 50 km 
3 More than 50 km 
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1.6. How long have you been in relationship (both in contractual and non-official) 
with the management of the corporate farm to which you rent your land? 
 
A. Contract relations relating to land             ……………. year/s 
B. Contract relations relating to other property relations (restitution, 
transformation debt, renting of property, etc)     ……………. year/s 
 
1.7. How often face-to-face contacts do you have with the management of the 
corporate farm relating to land contract? 
 
1 Usually once in several years 
2 Usually once a year 
3 Usually twice a year 
4 Usually more than three times a year 
5 So far, I have not been in touch at all, because it is in charge of my co-owner   
 
1.8. Do you know relatively well some other landowners of the corporate farm? 
 
1 None of them 
2 Less than half of them 
3 More than half of them 
4 All of them 
 
  
 
 Cadastral area 1 Cadastral area 2  
1.9.1. Please give the name of COUNTY and CADASTRAL 
AREA, in which you rent the land 
 
 
For each land culture and cadastral area please complete 
the information below. 
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1.9.2. Please write the number of plots        
1.9.3. What is the total area of these plots (ha)?         
1.9.4. Since when are you the owner of this plot (year)?       
1.9.5. Since when do you rent out this plot to the corporate 
farm (year)?       
1.9.6. How much is the rent that you received last year 
(2004) for each  plot?  (NOT in CZK//ha but in CZK/plot)       
1.9.7. How big is your co-owner share (%)?  %  % % % %  %  % % % % 
1.9.8. Has any type of land reform been made in the above 
stated cadastral areas? 
1 complex land reform 
2 simple land reform 
3 no land reform 
1 complex land reform 
2 simple land reform 
3 no land reform 
1.9.9. If no land reform was done, please state the 
accessibility of your plots in the field 
1 all without access 
2 most of them without access 
3 most of them accessible 
4 all accessible 
1 all without access 
2 most of them without access 
3 most of them accessible 
4 all accessible  
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1.9. Please answer the following questions for each cadastral area in which you rent out your land 
 
 
If you are co-owner, answer only for the part of land you own, and please specify in question 1.9.7. the size of your share. 
If the type of culture of the plot virtually does not correspond with that stated in cadastral records, please state that being in cadastral 
records. 
If you do not know the answer write „X“.  
 * This column is to be filled  only in case you don’t know the type of land culture on your plots
    
      
Please answer the following questions relating to your land contract: 
 
1.13. Your land contract is a: 
1 Fixed-term contract (give the number of years ………………) 
2 Indefinite-term contract 
 
1.14. Your land contract is: 
1 Without noticed period   
2 With fixed noticed period (give the number of years………………) 
 
1.15. Is the rent level fixed for the whole contract period? 
 1 yes 
 0 no 
 
1.16. How is your rent usually paid? Please indicate for each option what share of 
the total rent you receive in that way (the total must be 100 %) 
 Share (%) 
1 In cash at the farm   
2 You usually get your rent by mail or by bank transfer  
3 In kinds  
4 Other way (e.g. services provided by company, etc., please 
specify…………………………………………………………) 
 
 
1.17. According to you, how is the rent level established by the corporate farm? (you 
may tick several options) 
1 the rent depends on the plot’s characteristics such as soil quality, location, etc. 
2 the rent depends on the length of the contract 
3 the rent depends on other parameters (please specify)…..……………………… 
4 I don’t know  
 
1.18. Please give the number of individual farmers and corporate farms who 
operate in the cadastral area where you rent out your land, and who could 
potentially rent your land.   
1…….individual farmer/s    2……corporate farm/s      3 I don’t know 
 
1.19. Have you been proposed a higher rent for your land elsewhere in the past 
2 years? 
1 Yes 
0 No 
 
 
 
 
 
IF NO, GO TO QUESTION 1.21. 
1.20. Who proposed you a higher rent? (you may tick several options) 
1 a Czech individual farmer 
2 another Czech corporate farm (Cooperative, Inc., Ltd.) 
3 another corporate farm managed by a foreigner 
4 other (please specify): ......................................................................................... 
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1.21. Did anybody offer you to buy your land?  
1 Yes 
0 No 
 
 
 
 
1.22. Who proposed you this offer? (you may tick several options) 
1 the corporate farm where you rent your land 
2 an individual farmer 
3 another corporate farm 
4 another natural person – out of agriculture 
5 another non-agriculture corporate farm 
6 a broker or a real estate agency 
7 other (please specify): ......................................................................................... 
 
1.23.Did you sell your land to them? (If yes, write how many hectares) 
1 Yes   ................ha 
0 No 
 
2.Characteristics of the (corporate) farm where you rent out land to 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IF YOU RENT OUT YOUR LAND MORE THAN ONE (CORPORATE) FARM, 
ANSWER THE FOLLOWING QESTIONS FOR THE ONE TO WHICH YOU 
RENT OUT THE LARGEST SHARE OF YOUR LAND. 
IF NO, GO TO SECTION 2. 
2.1.What is the legal form of the corporate farm where you rent land to?(tick only 
one option) 
1 Cooperative  
2 Limited liability Company 
3 Joint-stock Company 
 
2.2.Are you member, partner or stockholder of this farm?  
1 Yes 
0 No 
 
2.3. Are you employed in this farm? 
1 Yes 
0 No 
 
2.4. If you are an employee in this (corporate) farm, are you simultaneously 
manager? 
1 Yes 
0 No 
 
2.5. What is the total area managed by the farm, approximately? .....………….. ha 
 
      
 
3. Rent negotiation  
 
Please fill in the column corresponding to your situation (tick either column A, B or C).  
 Situation A  
In the past 2 years, you have asked for a rent increase. 
 
Situation B  
In the past 2 years, you have not asked for a rent increase but 
you have considered it. 
 
3.1.A. What was the reason for asking for a rent increase?(you may tick 
several options) 
1 You were able to get a higher rent elsewhere. 
2 You heard that other landowners in this corporate farm had their rent 
increased. 
3 Other reason (please specify):  
.................................................................................................................. 
3.1. B. What was the reason for considering asking for a rent 
increase? (you may tick several options) 
1 You were able to get a higher rent elsewhere. 
2 You heard that other landowners in this corporate farm 
had their rent increased. 
3 Other reason (please specify): 
…………………………….................................................. 
A. How much was the increase that you asked for approximately? 
(CZK/ha)......................................................................................................... 
3.2. B. How much was the increase that you thought to ask for 
approximately? (CZK/ha)….…………………........................ 
Situation C  
In the past 2 years you have 
not asked for a rent increase, 
nor considered it.  
3.2.A. Was your request accepted?  
1 Yes 
0 No 
If yes, go to section 4, if no, continue with question 3.4. 
3.1. C. Why did not you 
consider asking for a rent 
increase? (you may tick 
several options) 
 
3.3.A. What did you then do with your land? 
1 You left it in this corporate farm. 
2 You withdrew it from the corporate farm. 
 
 
3.3. B. Why did not you ask for a rent increase? (you may tick 
several options) 
1 You thought you would not get it. 
2 You realised that the rent that you were receiving in the 
corporate farm was appropriate 
3 The corporate farm increased your rent without you to ask 
for it. 
4 Your contract specifies the rent can not be increased 
during the period of duration 
5 Other (please specify):  
 
………………………………………………. 
1 You were happy with the 
rent level. 
2 Your contract specifies the 
rent can not be increased 
during the period of duration.  
3 Other (please specify):  
 
…………………………….. 
FOR THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS PLEASE ANSWER FOR ALL LAND WHICH YOU OWN AND RENT OUT TO ANY 
CORPORATE FARM. 
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4. Land withdrawal 
 
Please fill in the column corresponding to your situation (tick either column A, B or C). 
 
Situation A  
In the past 5 years, you have withdrawn land from 
this corporate farm or from another corporate farm. 
Situation B  
In the past 5 years, you have not withdrawn land from 
this corporate farm or from another corporate farm but 
you have considered it. 
Situation C  
In the past 5 years, you have never considered 
withdrawing land from this corporate farm or 
from another corporate farm. 
4.1.A. What were the reasons for withdrawing? 
(you may tick several options) 
1 You were not happy with the level of rent. 
2 You wanted to start your own farm. 
3 You were not happy with the care for your land 
4 Other (please specify): ……………………… 
4.1.B. What were the reasons for considering 
withdrawing? (you may tick several options) 
1 You were not happy with the level of rent. 
2 You wanted to start your own farm. 
3 You were not happy with the care for your land 
4 Other (please specify): 
4.2.A. How much in total did you withdraw from 
any corporate farm? ……………………… ha              
 
4.2.B. How much approximately in total did you 
consider withdrawing?.................................... ha 
4.3.A.  What did you do with the land that you 
withdrew? (you may tick several options) 
1 You rented it out to another farm. 
2 You sold it. 
3 You started your own farm. 
4 You rented it back to the same corporate farm. 
5 Other (please specify): ……………………… 
……………………………………………………  
If you tick option 4, please continue with 
question 4.4.A., otherwise go to section 5. 
4.4.A. Please indicate how much per ha you rented 
it back…………………………………CZK 
4.3. B. Why did not you withdraw it? (you may tick 
several options) 
1 You got a rent increase. 
2 You realised that there was no other opportunity for 
a better rent elsewhere. 
3 You were not happy with the land parcel proposed 
by the corporate farm. 
4 You realised that it was too risky or not profitable to 
farm yourself your land. 
5 There were problems with withdrawing parcels from 
the land blocks and to ensure the access to the plot. 
6 My co-owners did not agree with the plot to be 
withdraw.  
7 Other (please specify): …………………………….. 
4.1. C. Why have you never considered 
withdrawing? (you may tick several options) 
1 It was easier to have your land managed by 
somebody else. 
2 It was too risky or not profitable to farm 
your land privately. 
3 There was no other opportunity for a better 
rent elsewhere. 
4 You were happy with the level of rent that 
you were getting. 
5 To be part of the corporate farm matches 
your own values and beliefs. 
6 To be a part of the corporate farm gives you 
other benefits outside the rent. 
7 Other (please specify): …..……………… 
……………………………………………… 
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5.    Future 
In 2004 each farmer cultivating agricultural land received CAP direct payment of CZK 3300 per ha of agricultural land. This payment will be annually 
increasing till 2013. To be eligible for this payment will require farmers to fulfil so called cross-compliance requirements consisting in using farming 
practices which are in accordance with natural environment protection and all its compounds (water and landscape protection, etc.) without producing 
anything for market. Moreover, a payment of CZK 3500 per ha of grassland is paid to plots situated in less favourable areas with a given livestock 
density.      
5.1.Did you already have this information? 
1 Yes 
0 No 
5.2.Would the information above make you to change your behaviour over the next 5 years, in terms of withdrawing or asking for an increase of 
rent for the land that you rent out to the corporate farm? 
 YES  NO 
5.3.A. What will you probably do in the next 5 years? (you may tick several 
options) 
1 You will ask for a rent increase in the corporate farm. 
2 You will withdraw your land from the corporate farm and rent it out  
elsewhere 
3 You will withdraw your land from the corporate farm and start or expand 
your own farm in order to receive the CAP direct payments. 
4 You will withdraw your land from the corporate farm and keep it in 
‘good environmental and agricultural condition’ in order to receive the CAP 
direct payments. 
5 You will withdraw your land from the corporate farm and sell it. 
6 Other (please specify):  
……………….…………………………………………………………… 
5.3 B. Why not? (you may tick several options) 
1 The CAP direct payments will not be high enough to compensate for the risk of private 
farming. 
2 The CAP direct payments will not be high enough to compensate for the cost or 
maintaining your land in ‘good environmental and agricultural condition’. 
3 You would not be able to get higher rent elsewhere. 
4 You are happy with the level of rent that you get in the corporate farm. 
5 It is easier to have your land managed by somebody else. 
6 To be a part of the corporate farm matches your own values and beliefs. 
7 To be a part of the corporate farm gives you other benefits outside the rent. 
8 Other (please specify): .……………………………………………………………………. 
5.2.A. Over the next 5 years, would you consider selling your land? 
 YES  NO 
5.3.A. To whom preferably would you sell your land? (please tick one option 
only) 
1 To the corporate farm where you are currently renting it out. 
2 On the market to whoever proposes the highest price. 
3 Other (please specify): ……………………….…………………………. 
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6. Basic individual characteristics 
 
6.1. What is your age? ................... 
 
6.2. Your formal education: 
1 Primary school 
2 Secondary school without “GCE” exam 
3 Secondary school with “GCE” exam 
4 University degree 
 
6.3. You are currently (you may tick several options): 
1 Student 
2 Employed 
3 Unemployed 
4 Retired  
5 Other (please specify): ............................................................................................ 
 
 
Your notes 
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Continuing question 1.9. Please answer the following questions for each cadastral area in which you rent out your land 
 
 
 
 
If you are co-owner, answer only for the part of land you own, and please specify in question 1.9.7. the size of your share. 
If the type of culture of the plot virtually does not correspond with that stated in cadastral records, please state that being in cadastral 
records. 
If you do not know the answer write „X“.  
 Cadastral area 1 Cadastral area 2  
1.9.1. Please give the name of COUNTY and 
CADASTRAL AREA, in which you rent the land 
 
 
For each land culture and cadastral area please complete 
the information below. 
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1.9.2. Please write the number of plots        
1.9.3. What is the total area of these plots (ha)?         
1.9.4. Since when are you the owner of this plot (year)?       
1.9.5. Since when do you rent out this plot to the 
corporate farm (year)?       
1.9.6. How much is the rent that you received last year 
(2004) for each  plot?  (NOT in CZK//ha but in CZK/plot)       
1.9.7. How big is your co-owner share (%)?  %  % % % %  %  % % % % 
1.9.8. Has any type of land reform been made in the 
above stated cadastral areas? 
1 complex land reform 
2 simple land reform 
3 no land reform 
1 complex land reform 
2 simple land reform 
3 no land reform 
1.9.9. If no land reform was done, please state the 
accessibility of your plots in the field 
1 all without access 
2 most of them without access 
3 most of them accessible 
4 all accessible 
1 all without access 
2 most of them without access 
3 most of them accessible 
4 all accessible  
 * This column is to be filled  only in case you don’t know the type of land culture on your plots 
 
